Working Class of China: Rising from the Ashes - A Preliminary overview (2)
First part of this article was published in the October-November 2008 issue of FAPP. In that part, purpose of the article was declared as to understand the complex process of re-emergence of "bitter class struggle among the rulers & the ruled ones (workers & peasants) of China" during post-Mao era. It was also said that "we want to understand this phase of struggle with the perspective that this time it is initiated by a defeated army, who once tried to emerge as an independent ruling class but subsequently got defeated".
So, we decided "to investigate the process of development of (this) struggle from historical perspective. To do this, we have divided the history of nearly last thirty years in three phases: (i) struggle of the 1980s, (ii) struggle during 1st half of 1990s, and (iii) struggle of the present phase (we felt that current phase of struggle originally started from 2nd half of 1990s and is continuing till now)."
In the first part of this article, we completed discussion up to the struggle of the 1st half of 1990s. Now, we'll try to enter into the process of understanding "struggle of the present phase".
To understand this phase of struggle, our discussion will primarily consist of
(a) mass struggle of the SOE workers,
(b) mass struggle of the non-SOE workers, especially migrant workers
(c) mass struggle of the peasants.
However, during this course of discussion, we'll also try to understand the role of revolutionary Marxists in these struggles as much as possible (as because dependable information in this regard is very few) during this phase.
We shall also try to deal also the role of different NGOs in this phase of struggle, as because right now in China these organizations are also playing a significant role in these struggles.
Struggle of the present phase
1. Mass struggle of the State Owned Enterprises (SOE) Workers
It is well-known that after revolution, new government leading Peoples' Republic of China made a number of experiments in the direction of transforming
Experimentations Towards Socialist Transition in Industry During Mao Era
After 1949, the new government of PRC confiscated all bureaucratic capital and foreign capital. It nationalized all major assets in transportation, communication, and manufacturing. Then, in 1952 it completed the land reform. After 1952, the government took several steps to nationalize the remaining private capital. By 1956, it completed both the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. The government legally transferred the ownership of the means of production to the state and to the collectives. Series of State Owned Enterprises (SOE) started to develop. These high performing SOEs under central planning were the backbone of China's first industrialization, without which the socioeconomic developments before 1978 could be adequately explained.
Prior to 1978, there were two forms of ownership of industrial enterprises in China: "all peoples'" ownership, i.e., "state ownership", and "collective ownership", owned by villages or communities. The phrase "iron rice bowl" was often used to describe industrial employment and its associated benefits. Employees enjoyed lifetime employment, guaranteed pension benefits, health care, housing, and education for dependents, paid maternity leave, and other such benefits which created a high level of societal equity and security.
How SOEs were operated & monitored towards Socialist Transition during Mao era? We are not in position to go for a complete critical appreciation of these activities; neither are we going to say that all were perfectly well in Mao's era; on the other hand, we just need to identify here some of the significant steps taken in this direction, which we feel have some impact in the struggle of the SOE workers during post-Mao era. What were these steps? The state tried to impose its effective control on the SOEs. Individual enterprises had the possession of the means of production - however, the nature of possession was limited by way of prohibition of individual enterprises the freedom of buying or selling in the market. The state determined nature & quantity of production, "prices" of the products "sold" to the state, as well as the "prices" of raw materials and machinery that the enterprises "bought" from the state. Products were sold to state & the managers in state enterprises had little scope to be involved in the determination of prices of the products. The enterprises also received wage funds from the state for payment of workers' wages and benefits, thus managers were discharged from the responsibility of meeting the wage and benefit payments from their revenues as well as the power of extracting surplus value from the workers. In this way, the managers had little scope to act as agents of capital. Workers in state enterprises had permanent employment status, an eight-hour day, and an eight-grade wage scale. This wage scale was determined by their experience, years of service and skills. Workers who made significant contributions to increase productivity by their hard work, team spirit, and/or innovations were selected as model workers who received awards and praise, but they did not receive any direct material rewards, such as higher wages, incentives, bonus or promotion. At the end of each year, the enterprises handed over their "profits" to the state & the state subsidized the enterprises that incurred "losses". The state appropriated funds of different enterprises for the developmental activities in the direction of raising productivity. The state had the right to impose all these legal limitations on individual enterprises. The success or failure of an enterprise was not judged by their "profits" or "losses". Instead, different standards were used to measure the performance of the enterprises: these standards were "quantity, speed of production, quality, and saving of raw materials and labour". The majority of state enterprises not only met the targets set for these standards, they strove to exceed the targets and their own record targets in the past. Still, there were elements of private capital in state owned enterprises. Until the Cultural Revolution, the capitalists still received fixed dividends and they were still involved in the management of state enterprises.
However, there existed contradictions between the workers and the state and party hierarchies. During Mao's era, these contradictions were resolved from time to time by the mass movements. During this phase, those in powerful positions were very much aware that they were under the watchful eyes of the masses.
Not only the contradictions between the workers and the state and party hierarchies, the reference of the struggle of the two-lines within CPC regarding the lines to be taken in SOE needs to be mentioned here. The contract labour system, implemented since the beginning of the reform, did not originate during Deng-era. It is now known that as early as 1956, Liu Shaoqi sent a team to the Soviet Union to study their labour system. Upon its return, the team proposed the adoption of the contract labour system modelled after what the Soviet Union had adopted. However, even before it was implemented, the changes were interrupted due to the "Great Leap Forward" movement. In the early 1960's Liu again attempted to change the permanent employment status of SOE workers by adopting the "two-track system". According to his proposal, SOEs were to be allowed to employ temporary workers; and at the same time, peasants were allowed to be employed as temporary workers in the mines. Finally, in 1965, a new regulation on the employment of temporary workers was announced, indicating that, instead of permanent workers, more temporary workers should be hired. It also allowed the individual SOEs the authority to use allocated wage funds to replace permanent workers with temporary workers. Again, the Cultural Revolution interrupted Liu's effort to reform the labour system, and, in 1971, large numbers of temporary workers were given permanent status. Although Liu could not fully implement his labour reform, he had "experimental projects" going on here and there, and before the Cultural Revolution began, state enterprises had hired large numbers of temporary workers.
As opposed to Liu's attempts to institute contract labour, the Anshan Constitution was the most serious attempt made to change the organization of work and the labour process in the workplace. The workers of the Anshan Metallurgical Combine took the initiative to lay out new rules to change the existing operation of their workplace. On March 22, 1960, Mao proclaimed that these new rules should be used as guidelines for the operation of state enterprises, and named them the Anshan Constitution. Five principles were identified in the Anshan Constitution:
(1) put politics in command;
(2) strengthen the party leadership;
(3) launch vigorous mass movement;
(4) systematically promote the participation of cadres in productive labour and of workers in management; and
(5) reform any unreasonable rules, assure close cooperation among workers, cadres, and technicians, and energetically promote technical revolution.
The principles in the Anshan Constitution represented a spirit leading toward the direction of eventually phasing out wage labour.
However, according to some analysts, in reality, prior to Cultural Revolution Anshan Constitution was not taken very seriously. While managers did not see any need to change, workers assumed that the conditions of their employment and the benefits endowed were to stay. It was only during the Cultural Revolution along with many other crucial issues, policies declared in Anshan Constitution were begun to implement. The workers and cadres in the factories openly discussed and debated many important issues such as material incentives, cadres' participation in production work, workers' participation in management, and factory rules and regulations, & Anshan Constitution was seriously begun to roll.
Here, a brief reference from the remarkable work of Charles Bettelheim, namely, "Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China. Changes in Management and the Division of Labour" may be mentioned, from which we get a living picture of the two-lines struggle on Anshan Constitution.
"... Before the Cultural Revolution the factories in the state sector were administered by the party committee and managed in their day-to-day operation by a director who quite often seems to have assumed both functions. In those days the director was not elected by the workers but appointed by the administrative department which supervised the factory. The composition of the party committee was in principle determined by the party members in the factory itself, but in actual fact the party committee was very frequently designated by high party officials.
In 1960 this type of organization, which excludes the participation of the masses, was criticized by Mao Tse-tung. On March 22, 1960, he proclaimed in its place the Anshan Constitution, which was inspired by the experience of the Great Leap Forward and by the initiatives undertaken at that time by the workers of the Anshan Metallurgical Combine. This constitution states some of the conditions required for the socialist management of enterprises, notably in the form of five basic principles. (...)
It took eight years for the revolutionary committee of the Anshan municipality to adopt an official resolution which made the Anshan Constitution the basis for the organization of all the enterprises in the region. This resolution was adopted in Anshan on May 22, 1968. It represents the culmination of a mass movement whose initiatives were thus ratified by the revolutionary committee. The delay in adopting and instituting principles set forth by Mao Tse-tung himself was due to the fact that the proposed new mode of management had revolutionary implications. It required the launching of a class struggle and a broad mass movement; this is precisely what happened during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao Tse-tung did not attempt to change the situation "from the top," an approach which could only have resulted in superficial changes. (...) The state of affairs that existed in 1960 could be changed only through the initiative and revolutionary criticism of the masses, especially since the advocates of the capitalist road -- the adherents of Liu Shaoqi -- tried to preserve the then prevailing forms of management.
The period 1960-1966 witnessed a struggle between two lines, during which the Anshan Constitution was set aside. (...)
The proponents of the revisionist line offered considerable resistance. The then prevailing forms of management in fact enabled a minority to benefit from its dominant position in relation to the means of production, and from its privileged position in the decision-making process -- formation and utilization of the accumulation fund, substance and implementation of the plan, technical changes, allocation of tasks, determination of regulations, etc.
Resistance to the replacement of prevailing forms of management with socialist forms of management was especially prolonged since it emanated not only from the "experts" in the enterprises, but also from individuals within the Communist Party, some of whom were at a level close to that of the central leadership and were part of what has been described as a "general headquarters of the bourgeoisie" that had been constituted around Liu Shaoqi. In addition, the distortion of the revolutionary line by the "ultra-left" undermined the implementation of this line. Whereas the revolutionary line, for instance, held that it was necessary to envisage the integration of the technicians and experts into the three-in-one teams, the "ultra-left" advocated their elimination. Many workers refused to accept this approach and the institution of new forms of management was delayed. To be sure, the struggle against the bourgeois line - against both its right and left manifestations - continues."
From above discussion, the points we want to raise here are that during Mao-era, (a) SOE workers achieved the right of lifetime employment and other benefits which created a high level of societal equity and security in their lives; (b) along with this, a journey towards the direction of abolition of wage-slavery, at least at its very preliminary level, was begun under the leadership of Mao- SOE workers were at least constitutionally recognized as the "leading class" in the new society & they just started to get the taste of their role as conscious organizers of the society, at whatever minimum level it might be; (c) however, Mao's conscious effort in this direction was repeatedly disrupted by the capitalist-roaders as well as by the ultra-lefts inside the Party & finally Mao's two-lines struggle within the Party on the basis of his concept of "struggle from below" was defeated; with the defeat of this struggle, the forward journey of the working class of China was halted. We want to trace if these factors have some imprint in the struggle of the SOE workers surfaced during post-Mao era.
2. Reform measures in SOE in post-Mao era
After death of Mao, Deng regime came to the political power & through them, struggle towards transition to socialism finally came to an end & capitalism was restored in China.
After 1949, newly formed PRC constitution defined SOEs as belonging to the whole people (quanmin suoyou) and managed by the state on their behalf. Its implication was that by this particular step, industrial workers had been at least constitutionally recognized as the "leading class" in the new society, not just providing only the job security and other welfare provisions to them. So, a major purpose of reforming SOEs was then inevitably a matter of redefining this constitutional recognition of these industrial workers, which could not be done overnight & by way of simply imposing some laws from above. So, it had to be introduced almost always in a gradualist and incremental way; thus two main objectives were set for the reform programme of SOEs: (1) to increase enterprise autonomy, with the aim of improving performance of industrial SOEs; & (2), to modify state ownership itself, in order to create and diffuse new forms of ownership. We can broadly associate the two aims respectively with an initial period of reform, from 1978 to 1987, and a second phase which started in 1988 and accelerated in 1994.
In this direction, during early to mid-1980s, some primary experimental schemes were made in Sichuan province in the direction of increasing enterprise autonomy, and in Guangzhou city in the direction of introducing private share holdings in SOEs. On the basis of these experiments, Contract Responsibility System (CRS) was introduced in 1985 as a programme to invest the managers of SOEs with greater decision-making power on a wide range of matters, including production planning, sales, pricing, wage & bonus setting. Managers were allowed to sign contracts with the government for the payment of fixed amounts of taxes and profits to the state. The rest of the profits, if achieved, might be retained and used according to managers' decisions. Profit retention created a major incentive for managers to improve SOEs' performance. Workers also benefited from this system, because of the possibility of assigning the retained profits to bonuses or to workers' welfare funds. In addition to that, their employment was still secured, because no reduction of employment was required by any contracts. However, the CRS gave SOEs an incentive to limit hiring new workers. By the mid-1990s, most state firms were under the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) created to further decentralize control.
In parallel with the implementation of the CRS, an important measure for labour management was adopted in selected enterprises in the early 1980s, and finally implemented nationwide in 1989: the Optimal Labour Reorganization Scheme (OLRS), designed to identify, and then to reduce "surplus labour" in SOEs.
At the level of an individual enterprise, the declared status of the OLRS was to assess the number of workers needed. Government formulated three different concepts of surplus labour: employment in excess of the enterprise's profit-maximizing level; employment in excess of enterprise's maximum labour productivity; and employment in excess of the enterprise's maximum production. According to the estimate at the end of the last millennium, surplus labour in some SOEs consisted at between one third and one half of the work force.
Along with CRS & OLRS, some more significant steps had also been taken during this phase. Like, since 1979, bonuses and piece wages have been reintroduced in enterprises in an effort to improve labour productivity. Since mid-1980s, as part of CRS, managers of SOEs were entitled to hire and to fire their workers.
In 1983, certain localities experimented with gradual replacement of permanent employment of state employees with contract labour. The experiment was extended on a national basis in 1986, through a provisional regulation. All the newly employed should be "contract workers", either on long-term contracts (one year or above) or short-term contracts. With the 1995 Labour Law, labour contracts were made mandatory in all industrial enterprises. In 1996, there were 55.5 million contract workers, half of all staff and workers in the state sector.
Since the early 1980s, Lay Off became legal for enterprises, including SOEs. Also, workers were legally allowed to quit or switch jobs.
Since 1983, a kind of "job-holding without pay" scheme was instituted, allowing unpaid leave of absence from the state sector. According to this scheme, state employees who found jobs outside the state sector or in other state units could try new jobs but still keep state employee status without receiving pay (and without medical care in most cases) for one or 2 years. If they were satisfied with their new jobs, they could resign from their old positions; if not, they were eligible to return during the trial period and maintain their pension and other welfare benefits.
Since 1988, reform of SOEs entered into the second phase, i.e., introduction of privatization. The early experiments in ?privatisation' have occurred mostly at the county and city levels, involving smaller SOEs. Among the pioneering counties were Yibin of Sichuan, Shunde of Guandong and Zhucheng of Shandong, which began significant SOE ownership restructuring as early as 1992. Since 1994 the phenomenon has become more widespread. At the end of 1993, "ownership reform of state enterprises" was adopted by the third plenary Session of the 14th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The "Decisions on Issues concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure" put the following reform policies on the agenda, without giving details of implementation: (a) transforming SOEs into a modern enterprise system, with redefinition of the ownership of state assets and the distribution of rights between enterprises and the state; (b) diversification of ownership structure of the enterprises by inviting more non-state ownership; (c) creating a competitive market (or ?level playing field') for state and non-state enterprises; & (d) speeding up the social security system reform by separating social welfare functions from the enterprises. These decisions led to waves of straight privatization since the late 1990s. Till 1995, the government strategy was to "hold on to the big and let go the small". But it was soon turned into a chaotic process, often involving local governments and corrupt officials. Not only small but also large and mainstay SOEs had changed hands, frequently sold to their managers or other "insiders" at knockdown prices. These principles were reaffirmed during the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in September 1997. At that time, a new policy formulation emerged in the speech of the President Jiang Zemin: a socialist state does not need to have the state sector as the predominant actor in the economy to maintain its socialist nature. This declaration has given the Chinese government the impetus to pursue further reduction of the state sector.
Other forms of privatization included employee-shareholding, open sales, lease contracts for buyers lacking needed funds, joint ventures, merger and acquisitions. The restructuring decisions rarely involved independent expert assessment or adequate regulatory auditing, and for the most part rejected any inputs from affected workers, thereby justifying popular indignation. Relevant rules and regulations including those mandating participation and consultation of employees were simply ignored. However, by far the most popular method of privatization of small SOEs is "Stock Co-Operatives". By making employees shareholders, their support was ensured for enterprise restructuring and gave them a personal stake (= compulsion?) in improving enterprise performance. After privatization, within 1997-1998, 40 per cent of small SOEs were converted to Stock Co-Operatives in Jilin, 50 per cent in Shandong, 60 per cent in Jiangsu, and 80 per cent in Henan.
In 1988, the first "Law of Bankruptcy of State Enterprise" was passed by the National People's Congress and the first case of bankruptcy of a SOE was filed in Liaoning province. The central government adopted in 1994 a more detailed regulation on financial arrangements for bankruptcy. It stated that provision for workers should be the first priority in any case of bankruptcy. However, bankruptcy became legally permissible after the 1995 law.
Finally, joining the WTO in 2001 signaled a huge move toward completing the reform. Under WTO accession terms, China is obligated to eliminate all import quotas by 2006 and reduce tariffs over time; and open up to further imports. Foreign firms and investors have greatly expanded rights?they can now own up to 50 percent of foreign-owned enterprises in industries such as telecom and insurance (percentage of foreign ownership in some industries was previously monitored and restricted). There are many other trade rules that China must now subscribe to, including the expansive WTO "national treatment" clause which states that foreign investors must be given the same considerations and treatment as domestic businesses. Contrary to popular belief of China's becoming Economic Power House No 1, post-WTO conditions, of course, greatly inhibits China's ability to direct its economy and gives more rights to global markets and investors.
A glaring example of the privatization of textile industry may be worth-mentioning here to exemplify the nature of impact of the reforms process in China. By the end of 1970s, China had established its own production chain for the textile industry: from steel to heavy machinery, to light machinery, then to textile and apparel production. Compared to similar western machines, Chinese spinning machines employed 10 times more workers but required much less initial capital investment.
However, since '80s, the Chinese government allowed the import of many foreign-made textile machines. By the early 1990s, China had essentially two duplicate textile production systems, one domestic and one imported. Each sector was capable of meeting domestic demand. This over-capacity led to fierce price competition, both domestically and internationally. In 1997, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji decided to solve the problem once and for all by ordering the destruction of massive numbers of domestic machines, which were considered inefficient. As a result, many textile workers were laid off and domestic companies that made the machines went bankrupt.
Many producers imported expensive machinery in 2004 to increase their capacity in anticipation of quota removal after MFA expiry. Fixed asset investment in the industry increased by 144 percent in 2004, and textile machine imports from Germany alone accounted for more than one billion euros.
China's textile industry is not the main winner as it receives only a small portion of the revenues and profits for textile exports?in some cases the value added is estimated to be only 10 percent. (Hong Kong Economic Journal, September 17, 2005) It is western corporations, the Wal-Marts and other brand companies, that pocket the majority of the earnings.
Chinese workers are perhaps the lowest on the totem poll in the current textile scheme. While many Chinese now depend on textile exports for employment, most are migrant workers who have been displaced from their rural villages and are now exploited sweatshop workers.
The picture is even bleaker when reviewing the ecological damage resulting from textile manufacturing. Cloth manufacturing and dyeing is water and pollution intensive, as is production of cotton. It takes approximately four pounds of pesticide and insecticide plus 1,300 gallons of water to grow one pound of commercially produced cotton. Ironically, the water-scarce western province of Xinjiang is the largest cotton producer for China because of its hot climate. Water is being diverted to this area to grow cash crops such as cotton while desertification is increasing throughout western China and water shortages are common for many rural residents. If all of the ecological costs were internalized, the already razor thin profit margin of China's textile export industry could very well be negative.
Anyway, let us be back again to our old discussion.Since beginning of reforms in SOEs, rampant corruption & state asset-stripping became order of the day. But, the question was not of mere corruption. There was some real planning at work by top-level government authorities in undermining state properties. In 1997, the State Commission for Economic Restructuring was prepared to lay off at least 15-20 million workers in the state sectors by 2000 (South China Morning Post, May 7, 1997). Subsequently, it was reported that in Jilin province of China's north-west industrial belt, 99.6% of SOEs had completed privatization by the end of 2005 & Liaoning province roughly followed suit. These governments treated private acquirers so generously that the latter needed only to buy fixed assets without any debt or compensational liabilities, with a tax exemption for three years & providing public funds to subsidize the cost of private transfers. Between 1997 and 2002, most provincial governments had decided to abandon sole state ownership altogether. Still, the National Development and Reform Commission's 2006 evaluation report insisted that privatization had not been thorough-going and must be pushed forward.
Now, international capital is aggressively participating in the privatization in China. Between 2003 and 2006, foreign spending on acquiring Chinese firms grew 12-fold relative to total foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. The UN Trade and Development Conference's Global Investment Report shows that in 2001 foreign capital used to acquire Chinese firms was less than 5% of FDI in China. In the first half of 2004 it rose to an astonishing proportion of 63.6%, and then in the first six months of 2006, to $41 billion or a 71% jump from the same period in 2005 (Green Left Weekly, September 6, 2006).
According to an estimate, by 2005, more than 70% of value added profits of China's information industry, 90% of the production and market of its motor industry, and 80% of the management of its machinery and petrochemical industries were in the hands of foreign capital (a petition to the NPC signed by a group of professionals and dissident cadres: "Strengthening Autonomy and Innovation in the Mainstay Industries, Preventing Economic Colonization," March 2006).
Where does China stand today after all these measures? The state's share of China's industrial GDP had shrunk to less than 20% by June 2007, as reported in the People's Daily. In terms of ownership types, at the end of June 2007, out of 8.761 million enterprises, 3.276 million or 37.4% were complete or partial SOEs, 280,000 or 3.2% were foreign enterprises, more than 5.205 million private enterprises made up 59.4% of the total number; and 26.214 million of self-employed businesses showed a 1% increase from 2006 (People's Daily, August 16 2007). According to All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce's report at the same time, private sector was larger: over 70% of urban employees were working in private units (People's Daily, November 19, 2007). Out of 509 "core enterprises" under State sector operating in 2003, only 161 were left in 2006. Under the central government, key firms overseen by the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC, set up in 2003) are now limited only to those in the petroleum and refining, metallurgy, electricity, telecommunications and military industries. But even here, protection has been weakened and barriers to entry lowered, resembling loosened state control in the capital market. It is announced in the official media in 2006 that privatization at the provincial level had "entered its final stage", while county level SOEs had virtually disappeared.
Another important aspect of this privatization process needs to be mentioned here. Privately Owned Enterprises operative in export Processing Zones, which account for 70% of the Chinese economy, are deeply dependent on US and other advanced industrialized countries to import technology, manufacturing equipments & components. On the other hand, former SOEs, once the basis of providing major technology/design & components in the overall industry of China, have now virtually no role to develop indigenous technology/design/critical components on their own. Interested readers may get some detailed information in this regard in the article "The Myth Behind China's Miracle" by George J Gilboy who is working as a senior manager in a major multinational firm in Beijing since 1996. His article was published in the "Foreign Affairs", July/August, 2004 issue.
Relentlessly exploiting its own cheap labour, pondering precious energy and other natural resources, and worsening its already polluted natural environment, China has been producing massive and massively under-priced commodities primarily only for foreign consumption. For example, goods manufactured in China and sold abroad at "the China price" saved the average American $600 a year (Ted Fishman quoted in Richard Mertens, "China on the Rise," University of Chicago Magazine, 98:6, 2006, p.6). Thus the major chunk of profits from Chinese manufacturing for export is taken away, leaving domestic workers on meager wages and brutal exploitation.
The most significant social consequence of privatization is the brutal victimization of SOE workers, including job loss/collective layoffs, deprivation of benefits, ruthless labour rights abuses, brutal working conditions & finally large-scale unemployment. At the same time, the psychological and symbolic impact of the loss of public recognition (given the old days of high prestige for the industrial working class) of SOE workers is no less important. SOE workers used to take pride in their work-related identities, and they relied on their work units for everyday sociality and support. Their exclusion from a process in which they were thrown out of their factories and related networks and trajectories has plunged them into emotional jeopardy beyond worries about subsistence. Such a crisis is evidenced by the intensity and extensity of the "rightful resistance" (to borrow an apt phrase for peasant protests - the politics of framing of such resistance dominates intellectual debates inside China) against widespread polarization, inequalities, abuses of power and broad moral decay in public life.
3. Resistance of the SOE Workers
On Dec 26, 1997, it was reported by Tribune-Star that: "Sacrificed to save decrepit state industries, the jobless are looking for work by the millions across China?an army of the discontented that has jolted the communist government with a spreading wave of protests.... So far the protests have remained small and centred on local issues.... Demonstrations have bedevilled China all year?more than 450 in the first six months alone, according to exiled labour activist Han Dongfang. Much of the unrest ... has taken place in Sichuan, a landlocked province saddled with outmoded factories far from prosperous coastal markets." ("China's New Threat: Army of Unemployment Creating Wave of Protests across Nation," Tribune-Star, Terre Haute, Associated Press, December 26, 1997.)
Even smaller individual upsurges have been partly planned. When an August 1997 demonstration by 20 laid-off workers outside city offices in Dujiangyan, southwestern China, was attacked by the police (who struck and kicked the protesters), workers were enraged. They responded by organizing "days of larger, noisier protests," receiving the support of "pedicab drivers," who, "as word of the confrontation spread...came out in force over the next few days to tie up traffic." (Ibid).
Not only this, there have the reports of the struggle of the laid-off workers in Mianyang, Sichuan province happened almost at the same time, which surpassed the situation described by the Tribune-Star. There thousand of workers conducted a street demonstration on July 7, 1997, "to demand new jobs". According to some reports, protests had been going on for many months, "involving as many as 100,000 people in all." The protest wave included "not only the workers, but also peasants...working in close co-operation," and sit-in demonstration and marches continued for at least a year. "Job losses have not been the only issue: the elderly have been demanding overdue pension payments, and peasants have been calling for compensation for land taken over by the government." ("Troubled Sleep in Sichuan," The Economist, July 26, 1997.)
In spring 1999, The Los Angeles Times alarmed the situation as: "Reports are rife of labour unrest across the country, from Hunan province in the south to here in the northeast, China's rust belt...(T)he government fears that labourers?particularly the unemployed, who number between 15 million and 25 million in China?might organize en masse to become the wellspring of new opposition to Communist rule. Or, worse yet, that disgruntled workers might try to link up with other disenfranchised groups, such as political dissidents, to create some sort of united national front." ("Chinese Rulers Fear Angry Workers May Finally Unite," by Henry Chu, Los Angeles Times, June 4, 1999.)
Up to this point, the government had been largely successful in containing worker protests and isolating and repressing activists. As Sophie Beach observes: "Without independent unions or peasant associations to protect their interests, workers and villagers regularly stage public protests against corruption, unemployment and economic disparities that allow the rich to get richer while the poor frequently can't even get their paychecks. But when protesters point out the sources of their problems and demand democracy and legal protection of their rights, authorities are quick to crack down." ("Tiananmen Plus Ten," by Sophie Beach, The Nation, June 14, 1999.)
However, Government was becoming more concerned by the growing worker militancy & began to bolster its judicial and coercive means of repression. In November 1999, the government announced new rules for public gatherings, requiring assemblies larger than 200 to obtain approval from local public security authorities. Gatherings more than 3000 would require the approval of security offices at a higher level. Although ostensibly targeting new spiritual movements such as the Falun Gong group, there was no doubt that the new rules would be applied to worker-community protests.
Finally, the significant wave of struggle of the SOE workers began since spring 2000. According to one analyst, its significance lies in the fact that it involved "stronger membership, unity, leadership, and a better level of organization." From March to May some 80,000 workers in two north-eastern provinces engaged in unprecedented demonstrations that lasted for months. Approximately 50,000 oil workers marched and demonstrated in Daqing City in Heilongjiang province; more than 30,000 workers from more than 20 state-owned enterprises held demonstrations in Liaoyang City in Liaoning province. "In both cases workers were demanding unpaid wages, pension and compensation, as well as protesting against the corruption and injustice of local officials and enterprise managers. And in both cases police and armed soldiers were deployed to put down the protests."
The protesting Daqing workers formed an independent labour organization, The Daqing Provisional Union of Retrenched Workers. Here it is significant that despite government efforts to isolate the workers, news of their actions spread beyond Heilongjiang province, leading oil workers in other provinces to stage solidarity strikes and protests. According to the report of Trini Leung:
"There have been reports that preparations for the Daqing Provisional Union of Retrenched Workers had been taking place quite some time before the March actions, indicating that the action was not spontaneous....The high level of organization and the relatively long period of preparation for the outbreak of protest actions is illustrated by the [fact that] the provisional union issued notices signed by its leaders."
The Laioyang protest by workers at the Ferroalloy Factory began as a relatively small action involving only a few thousand workers, but grew stronger and larger in response to state repression. "Police brutality against the demonstrations and the detention of several representatives one week after the first protest action was staged brought 30,000 workers from over a dozen factories out in the streets of Liaoyang to express their support and solidarity for the Ferroalloy workers. The Ferroalloy workers continued for several months to organize regular demonstrations demanding the government release their representatives and respond to their calls for investigation into corruption in their enterprise and in the local government. The main strength of the Liaoyang protests lies in their high level of organization which unites the plant's workers around an open leadership. In this sense the Liaoyang Ferroalloy Factory workers have organized the most successful archetype of an independent union in China since 1949."
NOTE: Information is taken & cross-checked from various sources. However, author is greatly indebted to the following books & articles for different information & ideas placed up to this portion of the article.
Source:
Books:
"Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China. Changes in Management and the Division of Labour", by Charles Bettelheim. Published by Monthly Review Press, 1974.
"The Great Leap Backward", by Charles Bettelheim. From China Since Mao. Published by Monthly Review Press, 1978.
"China and Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle", by Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett. Monthly Review, July-August 2004
"China Crossroads Socialism, An Unofficial Manifesto of Proletarian Democracy", by Chen Erjhin; Translated by Robin Munro. Published by Verso, London 1984.
Articles:
"Labour Market Aspects Of State Enterprise Reform In China", by Fan Gang, Maria Rosa Lunati and David O'Connor, Source: http://oberon.sourceoecd.org/vl=4908309/cl=17/nw=1/rpsv/cgi-bin/wppdf?file=5lgsjhvj7c38.pdf
"Against Privatization in China: A Historical and Empirical Argument", by Lin Chun, Source: http://www.springerlink.com/content/717543118n315402/fulltext.pdf, Published online on 22.01.2008
"The Myth Behind China's Miracle", by George J. Gilboy, From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2004.Source: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040701faessay83405/george-j-gilboy/the-myth-behind-china-s-miracle.html
"China Copes With Globalization: A Mixed Review", A Report by The International Forum on Globalization. Source: http://www.ifg.org/pdf/FinalChinaReport.pdf
"Mao's legacy in China's current development": Pao-Yu Ching, Source: http://www.chinastudygroup.org/index.php?
Trade & Development Report, 2007, UNCTAD
"China, Capitalist Accumulation, and Labour" by Martin Hart-Landsberg & Paul Burkett, "Monthly Review", May2007.
"China Labour reform and the challenge facing the working class", by Raymond W K Lau, "Capital & Class", Spring 1997 Source: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3780/is_199807/ai_n8803901
"China: six years after Tiananmen - capitalism in China", by Li Minqi. Monthly Review. Jan 1996. Source: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1132/is_n8_v47/ai_17922491
"A Summary of the Chinese Labour Movement Since 1949", by Tim Pringle, China Labour Bulletin, 17 August 2001. Source: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/55/290.html
"Rethinking Socialism: What Is Socialist Transition?" by Deng-Yuan Hsu and Pao-Yu Ching. Source: http://www.marx2mao.net/Other/WIST.html
"Extending the limits of field research: Encounters with Chinese workers protesting fraudulent privatization", by Stephen Philion. Source: http://stephenphilion.efoliomn2.com/vertical/Sites/%7BFBE560D8-72A3-42C7-B50D-7E4541ECA31E%7D/uploads/%7B03DEFF7F-1734-4875-9B7A-CE3F2D56DD84%7D.DOC
"Workers' Democracy vs Privatization in China", By Stephen Philion. Source: http://www.sdonline.org/44/philion.htm
"The Third Wave of the Chinese Labour Movement in the Post-Mao Era," by Trini Leung, China Labour Bulletin, June 2, 2002.
"The Liaoyang Workers' Struggle: Portrait of a Movement" China Labour Bulletin, Hong Kong, July 2003. Source: http://www.china-labour.org.hk/public/contents/article?revision%5fid =18683&item%5fid=2938
Websites:
Monthly Review & MrZine.http://www.monthlyreview.org/index.php. & http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/
China Study Group. http://chinastudygroup.net/
China Labour Bulletin. http://www.china-labour.org.hk/
Comments:
No Comments for View