Working Class of China: Rising from the Ashes - A Preliminary overview (1)
: till mid-1990s
Introduction
Since last few years, Chinese Economic Growth Model is being projected as the most viable economic model by the imperialism and its coveted ideologues. Not only that, so-called ?Lefts? across the world, like CPI ? CPI(M) of our country are also projecting this model not only as an alternative, but also as a ?socialist? model with a new connotation ? ?Market Socialism? and in this way are trying to confuse the working class in their own way.
At the same time, since last few years, reports are coming almost every alternate day highlighting the grave conditions of industrial workers of China, particularly those who are working in SEZ-s (Special Economic Zones, a very important step as part of this so-called ?alternative? ?Economic Growth Model?). They are working in an inhuman working condition and are facing a very crude and brutal exploitation. Such reports also suggest that contradiction between the opposing classes in Chinese society is becoming sharper; resistances against the effects of such an ?alternative? ?Growth Model? by the workers and peasant masses are on the increase.
Advance representatives of the working class across the globe are keenly watching developments of China with much interest and are trying to develop their understanding on the subject. As part of this process, we would like to present our views on that subject, but before that we just mention ? and we have said it times and again that China was never a Socialist Country, at least as Marx-Engels & Lenin had perceived Socialism in their writings, rather she was in the early stage of transition towards socialism. During this transition stage, China, under the leadership of Comrade Mao, undertook some of the very bold and daring experiments, and at the same time, initiated some significant struggle in the direction of revolutionary transformation of Chinese economy and society as a whole towards socialist reconstruction. However, working class of China was defeated in this struggle and capitalism has been restored in China. We strongly feel that economic reform measures initiated in the post-Mao period were consciously taken with the sole motive to complete restoration of capitalist economy in China. But how the capitalist line established itself in the party and state and why it could do so is a separate question which is out of the ambit of the present discussion.
To us, the present phase of struggle of the workers and peasantry of China that has been occurring since the establishment of Deng regime appears as the manifestation of class domination over the workers and peasants and bitter class struggle among the rulers and the ruled ones (workers and peasants) in China. However, we want to understand this phase of struggle with the perspective that this time it is initiated by a defeated army, who once tried to emerge as an independent ruling class but subsequently got defeated. In this article, we have taken an initiative to understand the process of a defeated army once again trying to raise its head.
We have tried to investigate the process of development of struggle from historical perspective. To do this, we have divided the history of nearly last thirty years in three phases: (i) struggle of the 1980s, (ii) struggle during 1st half of 1990s, and (iii) struggle of the present phase (we felt that the present phase of struggle originally started from 2nd half of 1990s and is continuing till now).
Finally, one more point before entering into the subject: It is true that every alternate day more and more reports regarding workers and peasants struggles are pouring into the electronic media, but still, relevant information to understand these struggles from the perspective that we have mentioned earlier (i.e., struggle ? by a defeated army, who once tried to emerge as an independent ruling class and was subsequently been defeated) is very limited. One major reason behind this is the large-scale censorship over reports and views that are coming from Marxists living and working inside China and having first hand experience of these struggles. Hence, we have no other option but to depend largely on Marxists living outside China. And, so finally we want to state that, our observation in this regard can only be very preliminary & partial. We seek positive participation of our readers to help us to make our understanding on the issue better.
Some Aspects of Post-Mao China
Before entering to understand the process of class struggle developing in China in post-Mao era, we need some brief discussion of some aspects of the development of this process.
[A] ?The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains?
According to some analysts, many of the workers, particularly that of State Organized Enterprises (henceforth, SOE) welcomed the changes at the beginning of the reforms process. However, it requires deeper, broader and what is more, minute study to ascertain how much this observation is true, and if it is so, the reasons behind the same. However, during first ten years of reforms, we could not find much information of the workers? struggle. And right now the significant fact is that, once impact of the reform measures on their livelihood started to surface, they began to feel that their lives were much better during Mao?s time, and they also started to express such feelings. As a whole, we felt that since workers primarily compared the two eras regarding changes of their conditions of material lives over a range of time span, first of all let us see some of the basic improvements which the working people attained in this regards during Mao?s time.
Between 1952 and 1978, industrial output increased at an average annual rate of 11.2 percent. The annual growth rate for agriculture, industry and transport, and construction grew at the average rates of 3.4%, 9.4% and 10.7%, respectively during the period of 1952 and 1978. Moreover, these gains were achieved with little outside assistance. In fact, with the exception of Soviet aid and that too only during the 1950s, China faced a hostile economic environment. As a result, China was one of the few third world countries to enter the decade of the 1980s with no foreign debt.
One of the most important accomplishments in those 30 years was that by the end of the 1970?s, even though China was still a poor country, indicators such as life expectancy, infant mortality, nutrition levels, and literacy rates in China, were closer to those of developed countries than of the underdeveloped countries. Chinese peasants enjoyed meaningful improvements in public health, housing, education, and social security, even though while the gross value of industrial output increased tenfold from 1952 to 1975, agricultural output only grew twofold.
In 1977, China grew 30 to 40 percent more food per capita on 14 percent less arable land and distributed it far more equitably to a larger population in comparison to India.
[B] ?It doesn?t matter whether the cat is black or white, just so long as it can catch mice,?
Abovementioned slogan was formulated by none other than Deng in the early sixties. And once colour of the ?cat? became irrelevant to the leadership of Chinese Communist Party, China became the poster boy for the whole of capitalist world in terms of economic growth as per their indicators. Let?s take a brief look in this field.
According to Trade & Development Report, 2007 prepared by United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), since 2001 to 2006, export has been grown @ in comparison to previous year is as follows ? 2001: 8, 2002: 24, 2003: 34, 2004: 32, 2005: 26, 2006: 25. China?s share of developing countries in global exports since 2000 to 2006 has increased from 3.9% to 8.1%. In 2006 alone, China?s total exports have risen by 25 percent.
In 2006 GDP was running at an impressive 10.7%. Average GDP since last 3 decades is approx 10%.
Since 1990, China?s manufacturing production has increased by more than 400 percent.
Chinese factories turn out 30 percent of the world?s air conditioners and televisions, 40 percent of the world?s mobile phones, half of the world?s cameras, and half of its shoes.
In 2003, Chinese workers assembled 40 percent of all laptops (after making none only three years earlier).
Major multinational corporations have set up extensive operations in China. Smaller companies are also investing in China, and most companies based in Hong Kong and Taiwan employ significant numbers of Chinese workers. Many non-manufacturing multinational companies such as Wal-Mart have also begun operations in China. In addition, China has spawned a growing number of multinationals of its own?such as Petro-China?that are becoming key players in the international economy. The share of foreign manufacturers in China?s total manufacturing sales grew from 2.3 percent in 1990 to 31.3 percent in 2000. From 1998 to 2003, the share of industrial value added produced by state enterprises in the non-resource based industrial sector fell from 17.3 percent to 6.7 percent, while the share accounted for by foreign enterprises rose from 11.4 percent to 17.1 percent.
Approximately 46 percent of foreign manufacturing production is exported, compared with only 16 percent for domestically owned manufacturing firms. Foreign firms now dominate China?s export activity; their share of China?s exports grew from 2 percent in 1985, to 30 percent in 1995, and 57 percent in 2004. As a result of these trends, the ratio of exports to GDP has steadily climbed from 16 percent in 1990 to 36 percent in 2003. An analysis published by the National Bureau of Economic Research concluded that approximately 30 percent of China?s growth over the period 1995?2004 was due to Trans-National Corporate activity, with the foreign contribution rising to over 40 percent in 2003 and 2004.
However, some economists are now predicting that soon the bubble of such economic growth will definitely burst. As Mr Pao-yu Ching of China Study Group, an online journal closely associated with Monthly Review has said, ?China?s overwhelming dependence on exports for growth can no longer continue. European Union and Japanese economies are stagnated and US trade deficits (one third of which is with China), which have been financed entirely by external borrowing, has reached an alarming level; China?s exports will soon run out of places to go. China?s financial institutions, heavily burdened by bad debts, are very fragile and will have to face increasing competition from foreign banks in China. The real estate bubble in China?s big cities looks increasingly like those experienced by the Southeast Asia countries in the late 1990s. Even some mainstream economists agree that the crisis is China is inevitable?.
[C] Working Class & Toiling Masses under ?Market Socialism?
Despite an acceleration of GDP growth, from 9.3 percent per year during 1980?1990 to 10.1 percent during 1990?2000, the growth of employment fell markedly, from 4.2 percent in the 1980s to 1.1 percent in the 1990s. According to an unofficial source, actual unemployment in China in 1999 was around 23% of the total workforce. Average annual growth of non-agricultural employment dropped from 6.8 percent in 1980?1990 to 3.4 percent in 1990?2000. As on 2006, 84 million people are living in cities having without any work, while in the countryside it is 100 million.
Today, approximately 160 million workers are employed in formal sector companies divided into different types of firms: SOEs, privately invested enterprises, foreign-invested enterprises, joint ventures, urban collectives and cooperatives, and township and village enterprises. Another 100 million workers are employed in other non-agricultural jobs in urban areas.
Most of China?s nearly 800 million ers still work in rural agriculture, but tens of millions leave rural areas each year to find work in cities, in industry, and in rapidly growing export factories in SEZs in coastal areas. Most do not have permanent residency where they are employed, and they bear the brunt of worker rights violations. Migrant workers, the vast majority of whom are women, are at the bottom of the social and economic ladder. These workers produce the bulk of export goods.
In a single year, 2002, workplace accidents reportedly caused 140,000 deaths in China, 250,000 workers lost body parts and suffered other injuries, and nearly 400,000 workers died from the cumulative effects of workplace illness.
Between January and September 2004, official statistics cite 609,429 work-related accidents with a death toll of 98,809 workers.
Throughout China, 160 million workers face hazardous working conditions, but only a third are able to get regular medical checkups.
40% of the country?s wealth is in the hands of a mere 10% of the population. Most affluent 20% of China?s population earns 50% of total income, with the bottom 20% taking home only 4.7 percent.
The overall inequality in China can be segregated into four portions: inequality within the rural sector, within the urban sector, between rural and urban sectors, and between regions. First of all, the gaps between low-income and high-income groups within rural China have been widening since the early 1980s. The trend was already obvious before 1990, but has become more visible after 1990. In 1990, the average income of the top quintile (20%) was only 6.3 times higher than that of the bottom quintile in rural China. By 1998, the ratio had jumped to 1:9.5. According to official claims, a mere 4.8 percent of the rural population in 1998, or 42 million, were poor. The World Bank estimates that 106 million rural residents lived in poverty in 1998.
Struggle of the 1980s
We have decided to investigate this phase into three parts representing three different particular type of movement which according to our observation has played an important role in the history of development of class struggle of China during post-Mao reforms process.
[A] Democracy Wall Movement ? Workers? Participation
In 1977-?78, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (henceforth, CPC) pushed through the constitution that granted ?freedom of speech, correspondence, the press, demonstration and the freedom to strike.? Deng moved to the top of CPC in 1978 and declared that no one ? ?even Chairman Mao himself ? should be copied unquestionably?.
Keeping such rhetoric in the forefront, Beijing intellectuals started gathering around a so-called Democracy Wall; each morning fresh new posters and poems expressing political criticism of the day were surfaced. It started in the middle of November 1978 and lasted till the spring of 1981. Deng himself approved of the wall calling it ?a good thing? and gave his tacit approval to the actions of the ?masses.?
As criticisms turned to Deng himself, however, the right to post criticism on the Democracy Wall ceased. Movement leaders like Wei Jingsheng were arrested. Many intellectuals who led the democracy movement went underground.
It is apparent that ?Democracy Wall Movement? was not started due to the effects of reform measures, rather criticisms voiced in this movement was primarily targeted to the political condition of Mao Era. And, it appears that Democracy Wall Movement was primarily a movement of the intelligentsia and participation of industrial workers in this movement could not be confirmed. Though, formation of independent Trade Union at Taiyun Iron and Steel works in 1981 has been treated by some analyst as direct influence of this movement. In this connection, Martin Hart-Landsberg & Paul Burkett, in their book ?China & Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle?, had quoted from the book Chinese Workers, A New History by Jackie Sheehan, where a statement from the unofficial publication of the Taiyuan Iron and Steel workers, namely Sailing Ship, had been referred: ?They [the workers] understand that if they want to change their wretched conditions, they cannot rely on any Messiah, they must organise themselves, to rely on their own strength, and to elect their representatives to speak for them, and if at a time their elected representatives do not represent them properly, they will be recalled and another election held. This sort of demand on the part of the broad popular masses is the social basis for China?s democratic reform. [B] Movement of the workers during second half of 1980s
Democracy Wall Movement did not bring forth much about the issues related to economic reforms in the forefront, rather brought the question of political reforms. But, more and more protests of the workers on their economic issues started to surface in the second half of this decade. And, to understand the nature of these movements, we need to refer some of the economic features of this phase.
Since beginning of reforms process, economy grew at a faster rate. However, after 1984, it started to deteriorate for some time. In 1988, inflation rate rose to 18.5%; and urban cost of living went up 20.7%. And by the first half of 1989, the price had soared out of control, increasing at an annual rate nearly more than 30 percent.
At the same time, while real wages during 1978-1985 improved at an average rate of 5.1% annually, and especially in 1984, it jumped almost 15%, but, real wages in 1987 increased only 0.9% and in 1988 only 0.5%. Thus, the differentiation between ?haves? and ?have-nots? thus became abundantly apparent in Chinese society in the last few years. As a result, tremendous resentment among workers started to build against the policy of Deng. A 1988 public opinion survey found that 88.7 percent of people thought that social inequalities were ?great or very great in China.? (Outlook May 23, 1988: 13-14).
At the same time, two-three important economic reforms measure had been taken during this phase and these measures took very important role in future course of movement of the industrial workers of China. Here, we are going to mention only relevant measures that are primarily required to enter into our discussion.
1982 ? Right to strike had been removed from Chinese Constitution, even though it is still not expressly forbidden, as per Chinese Law. But, for inciting strike, leaders can be legally detained and sent to ? camps? for ?re-education?.
1985 ? some state owned enterprises were given the discretion to de-link themselves from the centrally-controlled standard wage scale, and establish their own wage systems.
1986 ? Contract System introduced in State industrial enterprises. According to this law, workers recruited by state enterprises from then on would have to accept contract status, no longer enjoying the benefits of life-long employment, popularly known as ?iron rice bowl?, as other state workers do. In addition to the uncertainty embodied by the new system, the contract workers also wouldn?t have privileges to receive other welfare benefits such as pension, insurances etc. For new workers entering state factories on a contract basis, they thus faced the prospect of becoming ?second-class workers?. Within 1992, the wave of universalising contracts swept across the country.
1987 ? Bankruptcy Law passed. Under the new law, if a factory would not show lots of output, managers would have the right to lay off a worker in the guise of a fine-sounding name like ?optimal reorganization?. And if it still would not earn profit, the government would let the factory go bankrupt. Further, according to the law enacted, a laid off worker would receive 50 to 60 percent of the pay from their previous employers for six months. If they were not re-employed by the same enterprises within next six months, they would be ?formally? declared ?unemployed?. Then they would apply for an ?unemployment relief fund?, which would be available not more than two years. Afterward, they would be left on their own. In the nation as a whole, according to an official report, three hundred thousand (300,000) workers became the first victims of the ?optimal reorganization? experiment and the bankruptcy law by August 1988: they lost their jobs.
Other than above three laws, during 1984 govt as well as CPC changed their previous attitude to handle the question of raising productivity in industry. Since coming to power, Deng implemented material incentives method, like piece wage rate, bonuses etc to improve productivity. But according to the government, as this could not raise productivity at the desired level of the government (according to govt statistics, from 1977 to 1983, while state industrial wages increased 6.1% per year and bonuses 53.6% per year, productivity increased only @ 3.2% per year and the state budgetary revenue only 2.2% per year), government changed their previous attitude. Since 1984, government started to entrust more power and authority to the managers of the industry to handle the workers for the purpose of increasing productivity. Managers? power was greatly strengthened at the expense of the workers. Managers were entrusted to decide what to produce, how to produce, and also the power to punish and fire workers, if required. Workers, on the other hand, had no say at all in decision-making.
At the same time, income differentials between workers and managers started to widen. In 1988, average monthly salary of managers was 643 yuan, while the average monthly salary for workers was only 152 yuan. In addition to high salaries, managers started to get fat bonuses. In Shenyang, fourteen managers were reported to have received more than 10,000 yuan bonuses and one of them received 34,000 yuan.
As a result of the expansion of managers? authority at the expense of workers? and the widening income differentiation between the two groups, relations between workers and managers steadily deteriorated. In a 1987 survey carried out by the Institute of Economic System Reform, 2,415 interviewees were asked to list nine negative developments in the Chinese society since the beginning of the economic reform. The relationship between managers and workers was identified as the most negative development.
As a whole, a Survey made in late 1987 in 33 different industrial zones and conducted by Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Science has reflected overall general perception of the Chinese workers regarding their changed position in the then society. They found that 71.6 percent of the worker interviewees believed that, rather than being the leading class, they had now been thrown away at the bottom of society, because workers had no political power, no money, and no higher education etc. What they can offer ?is only manual labour, which is less compensated for now-a-days?. Another subsequent survey showed that those who felt that workers? social status was declining had gone up to 83 percent.
All these factors effected working class and they started to resist the attacks in their own way.
The passive form of resistance was not to work hard. In 1986, the NCTU conducted a large-scale survey about workers? attitude towards their jobs under the reform, which involved 640,000 state enterprise employees. Fifty percent of workers admitted that they did not work to their potential.
For some cases, violent form of resistance was found. In Liaoning province, from January to July 1988, there were 276 reported incidents in which factory managers were beaten and a total of 297 managers were injured. In 1988 alone, at least three managers of Shenyang were reportedly murdered because of disputes with their subordinates. Workers in many cases showed no sympathy for the injured and the dead managers. Instead, they said: ?It is good to have someone to teach those sons of bitches a lesson? (?China Daily?, August 30, 1988).
The organized form of resistance also did not fall behind. During this time, strikes again became a common form of struggle. According to an official estimate, the first ten months of 1988 witnessed more than 700 incidents of strike. The largest one took place in the No. 3 Cotton Mill of Xiaoshan County in Zhejiang province, involving 1,500 workers. The longest one occurred in Northwest Medical Instruments Plant of Xian city, lasting more than three months starting from late December of 1987 and continued till the end of March of 1988. Yet these strikes by and large had appeared as a localized affair.
In this context, another information appears to be very important to understand the aspiration of the working class of China during 1980s. Role of official trade union during this phase had already been transformed merely to a transmission belt of the party & state to implement reforms package to the workers and on the other hand, formation of independent trade union was banned. In this situation, workers tried to bring forth their opposition to this policy of the party & state in the Eleventh National Congress of Trade Unions convened in October 1988.
In the Congress, party & state tried to pacify the increasingly militant working class. Zhao Ziyang made a lengthy speech trying to convince the participants that they should obey management for the sake of their own interests. But many participants were apparently not convinced. All the three candidates for the leading positions of the new NCTU recommended by Deng?s Party centre encountered difficulties to be elected. One of them, Wan Shaofen, actually lost the election. Ni Zhifu, former chairman of the NCTU, was nominated by Deng Xiaoping to stay in the position. But many participants of the congress held that he was not competent because during his preceding term of office he had been always compliant to what Deng said but had rarely acted as a representative of the working class. Only after Deng stepped up his personal intervention was Ni able to get just enough votes to be elected. Another candidate, Zhu Houzhen, also suffered from distrust. Ironically, it was Zhu Houzhen who made the decision to stage a national general strike on the eve of the declaration of martial law during 1989 protest movement.
The Eleventh National Congress of Trade Unions was a truly unprecedented event. If the participants of an official congress, who were carefully screened, could behave so uncooperatively, we may imagine how strong ordinary workers? desire to have a ?real? union would be.
It was such resentment against the Deng?s policies that brought hundreds of thousands of workers to the street during the protest movement of 1989. It should also be worth mentioning here that the resentment was not merely on economic issues. It appears that some sort of political realization of the then current situation, however insufficient it might be, also started to pour into the minds of the workers. A worker had summed up his realization of the situation in 1988 in this way: ?This government favours every social group except the working class. The so-called ?leading class of the society? has been consigned to limbo. Not only has the government not showed any kindness to workers, it has further tried in various ways to abuse us. The new system of rewards and penalties, the reform of public health service, the new housing program, and so on and so forth. You name it. Which one is not against our interests?? It will not be irrelevant to mention here that during this phase, workers began to compare Mao and Deng openly, obviously favouring the former. A new ?Mao Zedong fever? among Chinese working people started to surface since 1987.
[C] Democracy Movement of 1989 ? workers? role
Next movement which drew much international attention was Democracy Movement of 1989, primarily led by the students. Initial demands of the movement were, among other things, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom to demonstrate, more money for education, and disclosing the private bank accounts of some top officials? children. On April 27, more than 150,000 Beijing students, defying warnings of the government, staged a massive demonstration. What made demonstration of 1989 so remarkable was that it was supported by the broad masses of people, particularly by urban workers.
On April 20, a core group of workers formed the Beijing Autonomous Workers? Federation and its membership quickly grew approximately to 10,000 and 20,000. As interest in the Democracy Movement spread to other cities during May, new Autonomous Worker Federations (WAFs) were formed and networked together.
In early May, the Beijing Municipal Party Committee issued a directive to all factories, advising managers to do whatever was necessary to cut off the connection between the workers and the students. On May 13, the CPC General Secretary Zhao Ziyang and the Premier Li Peng met workers? representatives and tried to pacify them. On May 15, Beijing Municipal Party Committee held an emergency meeting to ?stabilize workers? (?China Daily News?, May 19, 1989). Despite these efforts Beijing workers began to join the protest in great numbers. On May 17 and 18, when more than a million people marched in Beijing in support of the hunger strike of the struggling students, workers became majority of the crowds. On May 18, ?New York Times? noted that ?the demonstration today was the realization of one of the Government?s worst nightmares ? organized worker participation in what began as student protest?.
Feeling heat from below, official trade union provided support to the movement. On May 17, the staff of the National Council of Trade Unions took part in the demonstration.
Chinese Premiere, Li Peng ordered martial law on the night of May 19. But martial law could not deter the students or the workers. While official trade unions hung back, workers began to organize independent trade unions. On May 25, a preparation committee for a ?workers? self-governing council? came into being in Beijing. Workers in the provinces quickly followed example.
Participation of so many workers in this movement is explained by many as sympathy of the workers to the hunger strike of the students. But it appears that this is somehow over-simplistic approach. Actually, workers? demands in the movement were in many ways very different from the students?. Workers anger were more about the attacks of the economic reforms which brought miseries in their life. The students? hero of the moment was Zhao Ziyang, the Party General Secretary, who had been known as a consistent and enthusiastic supporter of Deng Xiaoping?s market-oriented economic reform (Zhao was ousted as general secretary of the Communist Party for supporting the student-led democracy movement and he was forced to live under house arrest until his death in January 2005). But workers slogans were ?Down with Zhao Ziyang!? More significantly, in protest marches number of workers carried portraits of Mao Zedong, who consistently opposed bourgeois concept of democracy and freedom.
Workers? involvement in the protest alarmed Deng & his regime so much that party & government struck out first and foremost at the workers. Even before the military crackdown, attacks were mounting against the worker activists. On May 30, the day when the Beijing Workers? Self-Governing Council was scheduled to be formally established, three key members of the council?s preparation committee were arrested (?China Daily News?, May 30-June 1, 1989). After the crackdown, most of the worker leaders were executed and many more workers were arrested.
In this context, observation of Li Minqi, an important student leader of 1989 Democracy Movement, appears very significant. But, prior to his observation regarding the movement, let us see his self-introduction. He said: ?I guess it is not exaggerating to say that in fact I was among the ?circle? of student leaders. At that time, just like most Chinese intellectuals and university students, I was a believer in capitalism, privatization and Western-style democracy. However, I began to change my mind soon after the failure of the movement. The failure of the 1989 democratic movement exposed, on the one hand, the serious contradictions between the different social classes and groups in the movement, especially that between the middle class intellectuals and the urban working class, and on the other, the fundamental limits of a democratic movement led by liberal intellectuals under the guidance of Western bourgeois ideology. To understand the failure of the movement and to pursue an alternative way of democratic struggle, I began to look towards Marxism and later became a Marxist.?
Now, his observation about 1989 Democracy Movement. ?It is true that the political demands of the movement were by and large ?non-class-specific?. It is not surprising that a democratic movement led by bourgeois liberal intellectuals is ?non-class-specific?, for behind the apparently ?non-class-specific? politics is the specific interest of the middle-class intellectuals. However, the fact that the explicit political demands of the movement were ?non-class-specific? by no means implies that none of the class and/or social groups which joined the movement did so for ?class-specific? reasons. Otherwise we cannot explain why the same kind of ?non-class-specific? movements led by the liberal intellectuals were not joined by the working class until 1989. Nor can we explain why in the 1989 movement the urban working class was much more actively involved than the peasants. ?While the Chinese working class failed to come up with independent political demands reflecting their own interest, its extensive participation in the 1989 movement can only be explained by the objectively intensified contradictions between the Chinese working class and the bureaucratic capitalist class by the late 1980s.?
Struggle of the 1st half of 1990s
The massive repression of Party & State over the workers? unrest during late 1980s and finally on Democracy Movement of ?89 forced industrial workers to reconcile his position in Chinese society and workers? movement went for a hibernation for some time. But, at the same time, party & govt also felt the anger of the workers and the intellectuals, and decided to slow down the reforms measure for a very brief period. Till 1992, nothing much was happened from both the contradicting ends.
Then again since 1992, Govt sponsored official media was filled with calls for ?smashing the three irons?, two of which refer to ?iron wages? (i.e. standard wage) and ?iron rice bowl? (i.e. lifetime permanent employment).
[A] Reform Measures during this phase
In 1992, some SOEs were allowed to conduct autonomous recruitment under state supervision. Minister of Li Baiyong reported in early 1994 that SOEs now enjoyed ?complete autonomy in recruitment without interference from government departments?.
3rd plenum of the 14th Party Congress in 1992 called for the ?step by step formation of a labour-power market? in which there would be ?mutual choice between employing units and labourers? and ?rational mobility? of wages would be determined on the basis of ?efficiency being given priority? by enterprises ?autonomously determining their own wage levels and internal distribution methods in accordance with changes in the supply and demand of employment and relevant government regulations?. Plans were to complete its implementation in non-state enterprises, which would be extended gradually to SOEs during the then Five Years? Plan.
Clause 27 of the Law, effective since January 1, 1995, further stated: ?Employing units on the verge of bankruptcy and undergoing rectification according to the Law, as well as those facing severe business difficulties, can dismiss workers if really necessary. They should explain the situation to the trade union or the entire workforce 30 days prior to the dismissals, listen to the views of the union or workers, and should make a report to state departments before doing so?.
Another aspect of the Reforms era, i.e., Trade Union rights and role of All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) needs to be referred here. Keeping in mind the anger of the workers of late 1980s and in anticipation of possible future dissention, new Trade Union Law was formulated and adopted at the Fifth Session of the Seventh National People?s Congress on April 3, 1992.
In Article 2 of the law, it was stated that, ?The All-China Federation of Trade Unions and all the trade union organizations under it represent the interests of the workers and staff members and safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of the workers and staff members according to law?, through which it was implied that workmen could not be organised in any other Union except ACFTU. Article 21 to 27 of this Law appear as targeting to defuse anger of the SEZ workers. However, at the one hand, some legal rights were provided to the workers through this Law, at the same time, the right was dwarfed in such a manner so that unabated profit of the investors would not suffer. For reference, we are providing below a brief look to some of the clauses of this Law.
?Article 21 If an enterprise or institution punishes a worker or staff member in a manner that the trade union considers improper, the trade union shall have the right to advance its opinion.
Before unilaterally deciding to dissolve the contract with a worker or staff member, the enterprise shall inform the trade union of the reasons why; and, if the trade union considers that the enterprise violates laws, regulations or the contract in question and demands that it reconsider the matter, the enterprise shall study the opinion of the trade union, and inform the trade union of its final decision in writing. (?)
Article 22 If an enterprise or institution, in violation of laws and regulations on , infringes upon the rights and interests of the workers and staff members in any of the following ways, the trade union shall, on behalf of the workers and staff members, make representations to the enterprise or institution and demand that it take measures for rectification; the enterprise or institution shall review and handle the matter, and give a reply to the trade union; (?) (1) embezzling part of the wages of the workers and staff members; (2) failing to provide occupational safety and health conditions; (3) arbitrarily extending working hours; (4) infringing upon the special rights and interests of female workers and staff members as well as the minor workers; or (5) seriously infringing upon other rights and interests of the workers and staff members.
Article 24 When the trade union finds that the enterprise gives a command contrary to the established rules and compels workers to operate under unsafe conditions, or when major hidden dangers and occupational hazards are found in the course of production, the trade union shall have the right to put forward proposals for a solution, and the enterprise shall, without delay, consider the proposals and give a reply to the trade union. (?)
Article 26 Trade unions shall participate in investigation into and settlement of job-related accidents causing death or injuries to workers and staff members and in investigation into and solution of other problems seriously endangering the health of workers and staff members. Trade unions shall make proposals for solutions to the departments concerned, and have the right to demand that the persons who are directly in charge and the other persons who are responsible be investigated for their liabilities. The proposals put forth by trade unions shall be considered and replies be given without delay.?
Thereafter, ACFTU in 1993, declared that it would no more be a welfare organization (running nurseries etc. on behalf of management), rather would act as a defender of workers? lawful interests. Since October 1994, it was decided that all new private companies would have to set up unions; by December 1994, trade unions were formed in 40 private companies. It was also decided that where unions were already formed, IDRCs were to be set up.
However, it was looked after by the party & state that ACFTU?s role as advocating workers? right would remain subservient to its more ?important? role to raise productivity, enhance production, educate workers in patriotism, collectivism and ?socialism?, etc. At the same time, it was also ensured that no local union could act independently without approval from ACFTU. As for example, in 1994, Dalian?s FTU was directed that workers striking without its approval were to be sacked and blacklisted forthwith.
Still in some private enterprises, workmen did not join ACFTU and on the other hand, formed workers? gangs, comprising workers from the same village. The formation of unofficial workers? groups clearly posed a threat to the ACFTU and the party & the state and they were disbanded with immediate effect.. There is a report in 1994 that the management of some Shanghai companies had set up some staff recreational or welfare clubs which also served to mediate disputes. Even these management initiatives were intolerable and the clubs were disbanded by the Shanghai FTU.
[B] A completely different reform measure began earlier, but whose effects started to surface during this phase
Prior to shifting our discussion to the struggles of the second half of 1990s, it is necessary to deal a very important step of economic reforms in China, on which we have not dealt earlier, though the step was initiated by the party & state during early 1980s. The step is opening China to the private investors, particularly to the multi-nationals and building up SEZs. It was that policy which Indian Big Bourgeoisie and their strong representative Govt of India, having hand in glove with the CPIM and all other electoral parties and all state governments run by parties of various colours and shades, is trying to replicate in India since some times now. Why we have not dealt this particular step earlier? As because, since later half of 1990s, information about working conditions of SEZ workers (mostly migrant , uprooted from villages, who are again products of the reform measures taken by Chinese Govt & CPC) and their struggles started to draw attention of western media and which again added some specific interesting aspect of the struggle of the working class of China. Before going this aspect of struggle, let us take a look of the particular reform measure.
It began with the establishment of four Special Economic Zones (SEZ) in Shanzhen, Zhuhai & Shantou (all 3 in Guangdong Province) & Xiamen in Fujian provinces in 1979-1980. Fifth one, Hainan, was designated as a ?special zone open to foreign investment? in 1983 particularly to draw overseas Chinese. Fourteen coastal cities were opened in 1984, along with Zhujiang delta, Changjiang delta and South Fujian triangle (i.e., Zhangzhou, Quanzhou & Xiamen). Among these fourteen cities, twelve were permitted to set up ?Economic & Technological Development Zones (ETDZ)?. By the end of 1993, nineteen such ETDZs were set up with the motive to ?leverage the existing advantages of these cities as good environments that would dependably attract foreign investors, and to accelerate improvements in China?s technological & management skills?. In late 1980s, ?National Industrial Development Zones for New & Advanced Technology (NIDZNAT)? were formed to ?develop country?s technological production level? and to ?strengthen country?s international competitive strength?. In 1992, the State Council approved establishment of fourteen ?Border-region Economic Co-operation Zones (BECZ)? in north-east and south-west borders of China. By 1995, thirty two ETDZs & NIDZNATs were set up, all of which were nothing but a sort of extension of the idea of SEZ.
Impact of these steps in the lives of the workers began to surface during 1st half of 1990s. Major issues were adverse working condition, like longer working hours, arbitrary wage cut, non/delay-payment of minimum wages, unhygienic working atmosphere etc. Normally peasants-turned-workers, working at very low wages, living at an alien environment and that also leaving family members, became a very vulnerable social group and an easy target of their private employers. According to a survey made in 1991 at Guangdong found workers working 12-14 hours a day. Not only that, refusing to work for more than eight hours led to wage cuts or dismissal. In May 1994, 4,000 workers of a Hong Kong based company in Zhuhai went on strike for being forced to work 12 hours daily. Military-style discipline employed to enable frequent monetary punishments, sometimes eating up half of total wage. Abuse of authority was rife, beatings common, verbal abuse widespread. Freedom of movement was often restricted. In one case, a Shenzhen toy factory forbade workers to return to their dormitory between 7:30am and 9:00pm (when overtime stopped), even during lunch time. Workers were often forced to surrender their identity and temporary residence documents. Most appallingly, in order to prevent theft, besides regular body-searches, some companies used to seal factory windows with wire mesh and to lock workers inside the plant during work. A fire occurred in one such company in November 1993. All windows were sealed, 3 out of 4 gates locked. As a result, 81 workers died in the blaze.
[C] Forms of Struggle taken mainly in SOEs
All these steps put the life of the workers in utter exploitation, but experience of the struggle of the late 1980s, particularly massive repressive measures taken by the party & government, forced them to keep their protest in a low-key manner. Without being able to build up resistances collectively, workers availed the opportunities of Industrial Disputes Resolution Committees (IDRC) in SOEs & State-Trade Union-Management Tripartite Arbitration Committees (AC) (both started since 1987) as well as opening of the opportunity of Collective Bargaining (started since 1993), ? however limited be the scope of these organs ? to raise their disputes particularly on delay/non-payment of wages, unemployment insurances, appalling working condition etc. Between 1987 and mid-1993, some one million cases of disputes were handled, 710,000 by IDRCs, 290,114 by ACs (inclusive of ?off-file? cases-those handled without opening a file on the case), and 1,115 by the courts. Ratio of disputes in 1993 in SOEs, collectives and foreign-invested enterprises (FIE) accounted for roughly 52 :20 :14 of ?on-file? AC cases respectively. Corresponding ratios for 1994 were 46 : 22 : 6. So, it is apparent that, protests in the collectives & FIEs had already been increased within a year. In the first half of 1995, disputes rose another 52% over the corresponding period in 1994.
However, collective, organised form of protests was not completely absent during this phase. According to official figures, 244 go-slows and strikes occurred in 1993. From January to September 1994, 1,528 collective petitions were recorded, compared to 345 cases recorded in 15 provinces in the first half of 1993. In Guangdong alone, 846 collective petitions (a rise of 69) and 425 strikes occurred in the first half of 1995.
[D] Organisations surfaced highlighting Mainly Workers? Rights
During this phase, different organisations promoting rights of different section of urban workers began to surface. It is found that during this phase, a section of Chinese intelligentsia took initiative to build up such organisations. Generally speaking, people who initiated these organisations were primarily not opposing the policy of economic reforms, rather they tried to raise their voice to make the reforms more ?human?. It is also to be understood that these organisations were not exactly the same as the ?social organisations?/NGOs presently operating in China and promoting human rights. At the most we can say that those organisations were the embryo of present ?social organisations?/NGOs. But the important point that demands special attention that some activists representing different communist trends opposing economic reforms with the realisation that Capitalism has restored in China, tried to mobilise workers through these organisations. For some organisations it is sometimes found that what they were propagating then were contradictory to their previous position, which signifies that two different groups with opposing views were trying to operate from within the same organization. However, the lifespan of these organisations did not survive long, as party & government were strongly against providing free hand to them and most of the organisers were very soon put under custody. Below, a very brief idea of three among these organisations representing more or less three different trends are being given:
In December 1991, the Free Trade Union of China (FTUC) was formed. They tried to organise mainly SOE workers. It labelled the Party and ?its privileged bureaucratic stratum? as ?oppressors and exploiters of workers?, who are ?extracting surplus value? from them, and whose ?point of departure? in reforms was ?only to maintain its power?. Reforms were criticized for ?taking away workers? original welfare benefits?, and ?abolishing the original system of employment protection?, ?bringing no benefits to the working class? ?since late 1980s?. Demands raised included both economic (wage increases, improving working conditions, maintaining full employment, etc.) and political ones (release of political prisoners; freedom of speech, of conscience, and of assembly; freedom to choose jobs; etc.). Its members were soon imprisoned for between 2 to 20 years.
In March 1994, Yuan Hongbing (lecturer), Zhou Guoqiang (lawyer), and others formed the League for the Protection of Labourers? Rights (LPLR). They defined workers as ?everybody contributing mentally or physically to society?s spiritual and material wealth?, which included ?labouring intellectuals, entrepreneurs, merchants, etc.? (incidentally some ten years later, Jiang Zemin, Secretary of CPC, in 2002, also tried to promote such type of definition of workers in the forthcoming 16th Party Congress). Only two types of people are classified as non-workers: ?corrupt officials? and ?evil merchants?. Though they tried raise some issues related to industrial workers, they highly praised post-1978 reforms for having successfully entrenched the concept of the market economy. However, its members were also either arrested or put under ?labour camp?, which signifies that the then party and government leadership decided not to provide minimum space to any sort of dissention even if they were ideologically closer to them.
In 1994, some students and workers formed Wage Workers? Federation in Shenzhen. Unlike FTUC and LPLR, which were more of the nature of dissident groups, the Wage Workers? Federation (WWF) represented a real attempt to form a union-like group. It published several issues of Workers Square and Workers Correspondence, coarsely stencilled pamphlets containing news items (such as reports of officials siding with FIEs against workers), reprints from some international documents, contributions from workers, etc. As a voice for migrant workers working under primary accumulation-like conditions, WWF had ?no antipathy to contracts?, and it simply asked for migrant workers to be treated and respected like human beings. Three members were soon arrested, whose fate has still remained unknown.
[To be Continued]
Reference: References will be produced after the completion of the article.
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