Bhangor Movement and Agreement - A Discussion
In an earlier issue of this magazine, we published some preliminary comments regarding 'Bhangor Agreement'. We had concluded the article in this way "so it is not the time for either congratulation or adverse criticism; on the contrary, the evaluation of the Bhangor movement from the perspective of revolutionary proletariat and to take appropriate lesson about the right and the wrong is not only essential but compulsory for all of us. ....we want that there should be open discussion amongst the Communist Revolutionaries regarding this." Several months have passed since the Bhangor Agreement has taken place. But it is unfortunate that the diverse experience of a movement of such a great scale in recent times (it is mentioned as 'historical' by many) like Bhangor movement has not become a matter of discussion amongst the Communist Revolutionaries groups. Only an article has been published regarding this in 'Chintan' magazine, though it is very brief. None the less, we have also seen another article. That article is written by a member of the Red Star organisation. It is known to us that Alik Chakrabarty, who was in the leadership of the Bhangor movement, is one of the leaders of Red Star. Incidentally, some articles (among which there is an article by their Editor) were published in the central English magazineof the Red Star organization while the Bhangor movement was going on. But after the Bhangor movement came to an end, an overall evaluation of this movement from the viewpoint of the working class and the lessonsemanating from it could have been presented in the best way by them before the Communist Revolutionary camp, and it was very much expected from them also because they were most suitably positioned in this regard being in the leadership of this movement from the beginning to the end. But no such article was received in the last five months. The main subject of the particular article in Red Star which has been mentioned above was to provide answers to the many oppositions raised about the Bhangor agreement from different quarters, to be more precise, to present explanations in favour of the agreement and the process of the agreement. On the other hand, the article in the Chintan magazine was also mainly on the agreement and the process of the agreement. The writer of the Chintan magazine criticized citing the events of the last three months of the movement which extended for two years, especially about the way the events advanced rapidly after the arrest of Com. Alik, that is the way the final agreement was imposed on the participants of the movement in a rash manner without considering the opposition of the participants of the movement regarding the proposal of the Government and in an 'undemocratic' way. The writer's contention is that the possibilities that emerged from the Bhangor movement have been wasted awaydue to this reason. Discussing the series of events after the arrest of Com. Alik, the chief leader of the Bhangor movement, the writer perhaps wanted to mean that the chief leader himself, that is, his behaviour after the arrest has been responsible for this. Nevertheless, all the objections, opposition, criticism of the writer is centred around the events of the last three months. So, he mentioned about these three months only while nothing has been said about the rest one year and nine months. It may be assumed that in his opinion, the leadership of the Bhangor movement was able to guide the spontaneous movement of the villagers of Bhangor in the right direction, i.e. in the revolutionary direction; but everything turned upside down, or to be precise, the movement had sufferedin these last three months. As far as we know, the opinions of not only 'Chintan' but also of other fellow revolutionary organisations, 'various struggling forces and individual participants of the movement' are the same. All of them have viewed the last three months in detached from the earlier one year and nine months. The question is here, whether it is correct according to Marxism?
In fact, if we judge or think in this way, we would face many questions for which it would be quite difficult to find reasonable answers or explanations. Is the main reason of the sudden visible change of Com. Alik due to his individual aberration or is it inherent within the thought process of him or his organisation? The question other way round is whether what we are considering as a change is a change of Com. Alik or it is the natural outcome of the way the movement had advanced? The person who earned unwavering trust and confidence of the villagers of Bhangor by staying at the forefront of a life and death struggle of 15-20 thousand people even remaining in the midst of a siege for almost two years, time to time defying physical ailments, why did he bring himself ultimately to such a position that he had to face the distrust and a bunch of questions of the struggling villagers? Here the question that arises is that how could this huge difference between the leadership and the standpoint and the thinking of the villagers precipitate which was expressed in fierce opposition, despite the fact that they had been leading those villagers for two long years remaining closely united with them. Secondly, was he self-confident that he would be able to pacify the participants of the movement if any opposition regarding the conditions of the agreement arose from them at all? Then, should it be assumed that to place Com. Alik in the position of authority of the movement and then to burst in opposition to the same leader - both are reflections of the backwardness of the villagers - the backwardness from which a considerable number of the participants of the movement could not beelevated, in spite of remaining in the struggle for almost two years? Is this backwardness the reason that Com. Alik was confident that he would be able to get the conditions of the agreement accepted and ultimately he could do so also? On the other hand, how could this blind faith develop among the Bhangor villagers that there should be no settlement in between and they would not stop before completely uprooting the power grid? Does this mean that they had the faith that they could achieve their goal if they continued the movement? If this was not so, then there would not have developed this strong reaction regarding the conditions of the agreement. It is not unknown to the writer of Chintan that one or two Communist Revolutionary organisations were involved in this movement from the beginning, of which we are very much aware of a particular organisation. In fact, they had considered their participation as a part of the joint programme of the Communist Revolutionary organisations. Naturally a question arises that though a joint leadership was active in the Bhangor movement, the Red Star activists, especially Com. Alik himself could get the final resolution passed in the general council in favour of the conditions of the agreement ignoring the other organization, despite the explicit opposition of that particular organisation. We have seen that Chintan has raised this question. Another question arises from here is, was there a joint leadership at all in the Bhangor movement? However, we will discuss this later. There is another last question in this context: why the other Communist Revolutionary organisations could not advance the movement forward with the participants of the movement who were very much agitated due to thecessation of the movement as mentioned by Chintan? If this was not possible, then why was it so?
However, we had started the discussion saying that it will not be possible and also not correct to evaluate the events of the last three months in isolation, separating from the previous one year and nine months i.e. the overall evaluation and discussion of the movement. We will analyse the above mentioned questions in the present discussion, but the emphasis will be given on the way the movement had advanced i.e. on the earlier one year and nine months.
Now, let us clear certain preliminary thoughts. Chintan had written in one place, " ... the movement became politically meaningful positivelywith respect to revolutionary movement when almost the entire revolutionary camp took stand in favour of it." Firstly, what is meant here by positively meaningful? Did the writer want to mean that the Bhangor movement became a revolutionary movement only because of the Revolutionary organisations taking stand in favour of the movement? Or, the participation of the revolutionary camp was not merely participation in case of the Bhangor movement, they were at the leadership of the movement and would develop the revolutionary elements and possibilities objectively inherent in the movement? If it is so, then this development in respect of the Bhangor movement would mean to become conscious and prepared for the united struggle of the mass against the mission of the capitalist class for destroying the habitable environment of mankind and the animals by ruining nature all over the country in an unrestrained greed of profit. In a word, it cannot be stated that the movement will acquire revolutionary character from this fact only that the Communist Revolutionary groups are standing in favour of any peoples' movement or the activists of a group are in a position of leadership of such movements independently or jointly with the activists of other groups. Actually it depends or will depend on the nature of the role taken by the Communist Revolutionaries in reality - although chiefly it will depend on the extent of objective possibility of becoming revolutionary movements, or to be more correct, the objective possibility of advancement in the path towards developing into revolutionary movements that is inherent in those particular movements (within the demands and in the consciousness of participants of the movement).The rest is the role of the Communists - to undertakeconscious effort to develop that objective possibility. Hence, if we want to evaluate the Bhangor movement from the viewpoint of revolutionary proletariat and to assimilate proper lessons of 'the right and the wrong' from it (it is a duty and is also mandatory), then we have to look into that one year and nine months mainly i.e. on the role the revolutionary leadership had taken in reality.
Let us now understand a fundamental matter. Peoples' movement is a very popular word amongst us. What do we understand by peoples' movement? We consider the movement of the exploited and oppressed people of different strata of the society who are outside the working class as peoples' movement. Thus these peoples' movements are mainly movements of people of various classes. From this consideration, starting from the movement for reservation, Dalit movement, movement on the demand of 'fair price' of crop, movement against eviction from land (there are small and middle peasants as well as rich peasants and capitalist landlords also in these movements) to movement against slum demolition - all these can be categorized as peoples' movement or mass movement of various classes (except working class). Theoretically and historically it is also known to us that to pass through Peoples' Democratic Revolution in order to advance in the direction of socialism in a backward country like ours, revolutionary movement of vast masses, to be precise, that of the rural agricultural labourers, poor peasants and the exploited and oppressed people of the lower stratais essential; on the other hand, it also equally or rather more important for the working class to be organised as a class to impart leadership to those movements. It is seen that there are a number of confusions, generally amongst the Communist revolutionaries and especially amongst the revolution-minded students and intellectuals - which many a times extend to refute the above mentioned fundamental Marxist theory which actually amounts to refuting the historical role of the working class leadership. The Bolshevik movement faced a similar opposition. Let us see what Lenin had said refuting such opposition: "From the standpoint of Marxism the class, so long as it renounces the idea of hegemony or fails to appreciate it, is not a class, but a guild, or the sum total of various guilds." (italics in original, Marxism and Nasha Zarya, LCW, vol. 17, p 57). Lenin had put emphasis on the development of the working class as a class in its real sense in order to establish hegemony over the peoples' movement because at that time, an ideology had surfaced which refuted or neglected the historical role of the working class as the most advanced revolutionary section of the society and their obligatory task to be organised and prepared to perform that role by rejecting the hegemony of the working class as redundant. However, Lenin cleared the other side i.e. the question of indispensability of the working class leadership in peoples' movement in another article: "The movements of the other classes are grouped around this centre; they follow it, their direction is determined (in a favourable or unfavourable way) by it, they [the people's movements] depend on it" (Strike Statistics in Russia, LCW, vol. 16, p 410; Third bracket ours). We have to understand this statement in depth but we do not have that scope here. What did he mean by 'centre' - party or working class movement - that is not clearly stated here by him. But it seems that he meant working class movement to be the 'centre' because of the way he brought up the words in respect of the discussion regarding the statistics of strikes. Though it is also correct that the highest organisation of the working class, the Party and the class struggle - the relation of these two is inseparable and from that point of view, we can consider the leadership of the party of the working class and leadership of the working class as the same, but it must be mentioned here that if the party is detached from the working class this is not true, at least the experience of the Communist movement of the past has shown it.
Let us come back to the present topic keeping the perspective of the above discussion in mind. After the defeat of the first campaign of the world socialist movement, the working class is still disorganised, disarrayed - there is no working class party, the stream of class struggle is almost absent, it is not in a position to exert any influence on the society and moreover, to become a centre of the movements of the different sections of the society. Only lately the workers have started to turn around and even that is happening in countries like ours by getting reorganized at the factory level. In reality, the working class is taking time to stand up in entirety assimilating the severe assault of the defeat. What is being seen on the other hand is that different sections of the masses are beginning to fight on various immediate demands or on demands of democracy on being cornered by the direct assault of the capitalists-imperialists which are bound to be confined within the bourgeois limit in absence of correct revolutionary direction. But these movements are only visible. It is really difficult for the revolution-minded students and intellectuals, whose concept about the working class leadership is not clear at all, to perceive the relevance of the newly emerging resistance movements of the workers at present. Hence it is natural for them that they will find possibilities of a revolution in the continuously happening peoples' movements in India and they are acting towards that direction in reality according to their capacity. But that is not the main question. The fundamental question is how should the Communists judge these movements, more importantly, what should be the specific role of Communist revolutionaries if they are in the leadership of those movements? It goes without saying that a Communist party which carries with it the legacy of class struggle and a Communist Revolutionary group who are isolated from the working class in the main are not the same. That which is possible for a party i.e. due to its organizational strength and expanse or in other words being the 'centre' of the working class, in order to influence the peoples' movements organised on various partial demands in a revolutionary direction, is not at all possible for a group or to be more clear, individual Communists of a group. It is very difficult and complex to determine the above mentioned role of the Communist revolutionaries in the midst of such impediments. Especially so because the general outline of workers' movement which we obtain from the experience of the worldwide workers' movements is absent here. Besides that, the present situation after the defeat is unprecedented. Secondly, there is tremendous dominance of reformism-opportunism and parliamentary politics not only within the general people, but within the workers also. So, it is not only difficult to ascertain the above-mentioned role indeed, but it is far more difficult to act accordingly, because it is to be remembered that the danger of the reformism-opportunism which is dominating the society at present is lying in wait all the time. In reality, we have to and will have to preserve our Communist existence by intense ideological struggle in this severely adverse situation until the party is built up on the basis of objective class struggle.
As far as we know, it is not that Com. Alik, who had established himself as the undisputed leader of the Bhangor movement, was present in this movement from the very beginning. The residents of a few villages of Bhangor region were fighting from before and Com. Alik and his fellow group members reached Bhangor after getting information of the struggle through some connections. Probably the organising ability, experience and above all, an advanced role of Com. Alik in taking some enterprising and bold steps made him acceptable to the participants of the movement which placed him in the position of a leader within a very short time. It goes without saying that the struggling villagers wanted Com. Alik as the leader of their movement. Later other associates and members of the organisation joined. Is it not absurd that being in a backward condition when they themselves did not have any understanding of reformist politics, how they could be attracted by revolutionary politics and regard Com. Alik as a revolutionary leader or an activist of a revolutionary organisation? Therefore the need of the participants of the movement was clear - they wanted an honest, fighting and expert leader. The question is what did Com. Alik and his associates want? The role of the revolutionary activists in a peoples' movement is not merely that of an expert organiser. The organizing expertise of Mamata Banerjee in Singur, Nandigram movements was no less than anybody else. But it is also undeniable that the way Com. Alik and his associates and of course the activists of other Communist groups led the struggle facing the state terror and uniting the villagers, combating many ups and downs, through this they undoubtedly established their identity as expert and fighting organisers. Especially the way they acted throughout two long years staying with the people is indeed commendable. We might take lesson from that also. But they are the leaders of a revolutionary organisation and in this case, leaders of movement. Any mass movement on partial demands or trade union movement of the workers (their victories and defeats) is not the ultimate goal and merely to organise those movements is not the task of the Communists. On the contrary, we know in Marxist analysis that to elevate these movements of the grass-roots from their partialness and isolation i.e. to draw in those movements towards the nationwide revolutionary struggle of the workers-peasants- toiling people or to help them to be a part of that bigger struggle, in different degrees as permitted, and to lead them is the real task. The problem or the hurdle, whatever you call it, is here only. Where is that revolutionary struggle, the party of the working class - in short, where is that 'centre' which is able to attract the movements of the grass-roots, on which they can depend? But this is only one aspect, not the whole. Whatever the extent of disaster is, the Communist movement cannot stop, it exists in some way or the other; class struggle is going on, however weakly it may be. In this perspective, despite the obstacles, definitely there are some tasks for us to do and there will be, subject to party-building and subordinate to the struggle for party-building. What are those tasks? What were the tasks for Bhangor movement? We will try to place our thoughts on this question here in brief. But we think that a discussion on this subject is essential in the entire Communist camp and then only we can take necessary lesson from the errors and the correctness of a movement of such a large scale like Bhangor movement which is not possible from the review of the three months. In this connection it may be remembered that the problems mentioned above were not faced by the bourgeois party Trinamul Congress and its leader Mamata Banerjee who were at the leadership of Singur and Nandigram movements. How easily they could 'elevate' these movements into the electoral struggle! Certainly we cannot think of Bhangor movement to be elevatedin this way, we should not think about it in that way.
About The Task
Firstly we should remember that all of the villagers of Bhangor who fought a long battle do not belong to the same class. There were landowners owning lands of various sizes as well as agricultural labourers. It goes without saying that the class-interests of these two classes are not the same. As far as it is known, the Bhangor movement had started in opposition to the forcible land acquisition in lieu of paltry compensation by the gun-wielding Arabul's hooligan army. It may be noted that there are two aspects here. First: forcible land acquisition with very little compensation is an issue of landowners only and second: the terrorization and browbeating by the Arabul's hooligan army which weighed upon the entire people of Bhangor. Thus it was also a matter of concern for the oppressed people including the agricultural labourers. We have mentioned earlier that the struggle had already started when Com. Alik and his associates reached Bhangor. It means that an alliance between the agricultural labourers and the landowners were already established to a certain extent. We do not know exactly that which of the above two factors i.e. land acquisition or the bullying by Arabul, was main. It is our assumption that it was also not clear to the leaders who steered the movement afterwards. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the demand of withdrawing the power grid scheme did not arise in the beginning. Com. Alik and the activists of one or two other groups brought this demand of withdrawing the power grid scheme to the forefront when they gained a foothold in the movement. They brought these questions forcefully in front of the villagers that how the power grid scheme would bring devastation to the people's life, ruin the agriculture, harm the expectant mothers and their future children and they organised several meetings in the village in support of their standpoint inviting some scientists also. It may be remembered that there was generally a controversy amongst the scientists themselves regarding the fact that whether power grid is harmful at all for the public life and even if it is, the extent of harm it can bring about etc. However, the above-mentioned controversy is not important for our present discussion and it is difficult to apprehend the content of the controversy also, but it is a fact that the villagers believed this opinion of the leadership from their heart and for that reason they stuck to the demand of revoking the power grid scheme entirely and were able to continue the fight unitedly facing the state terror till the last. In reality, the struggling villagers of Bhangor, who started the fight against the high-handedness of Arabul, especially with the demand of appropriate compensation for the acquired land, could establish their movement on a strong foundation. It seems that their zeal was heightened. The inclusion of this aspect, i.e. the destruction of the environment entailed some other events. Many intellectual, progressive and democratic people came forth to support the fight of the villagers which boosted the morale of the participants of the movement. Com. Alik and his associates brought the struggle of the villagers out of the bound of fight against the high-handedness of Arabul and the demand of compensation for the land and focussed on the question of destruction of the environment. The Bhangor movement gained from this as a local movement but at the same time, another thing also happened. Objectively the Bhangor movement became connected with a bigger struggle - the united revolutionary struggle of the people - which can develop only under the leadership of the working class - against the way the capitalists-imperialists are indiscriminately destroying the nature all over the world in their campaign for super-profit. Naturally, the important task to prepare and bring consciousness to the struggling agricultural labourers separately, or at least to make conscious effort for this bigger struggle for which they presented a democratic perspective, lay upon the revolutionary leadership of the Bhangor movement, besides their task of leading the movement confronting various adversities, while maintaining the unity of the participants of the movement. But unfortunately, it is really doubtful whether they were really attentive to this task at all from the way the Bhangor movement progressed (and ended) and the reason they pleaded for taking CPM in alliance. It is notable that Com. Alik and his associates said very many things in favour of the agreement after it was finalized, put emphasis on 'what we gained', but there was no mention of the extent to which the level of democratic consciousness of the advanced fighters regarding the environment was raised or if it could not be done, then why did it fail. The question remains then that did the leadership bring the subject of the environment to the forefront only in a narrow sense to place the local movement of Bhangor on a strong base? It will not be an overstatement that as more emphasis was given to the present to ensure the success of the movement, the future was relegated to the background, and the revolutionary interest remained neglected.
Let us judge it from another aspect. The writer of Chintan magazine wrote in one place, ".... this movement was present with immense possibilities...". But he did not state clearly what were the possibilities. He only said that the spontaneous awakening of the people, standing firmly in the face of terror in a condition of siege, many sacrifices etc. were not given proper 'recognition' and he blamed the last three months for this. The complaint of not giving recognition may be understood. But what would happen if recognition was given? He did not say anything about what would have happened if the possibilities he mentioned were realised. But the way he blamed the activities of the last three months (mainly the activities of the main leader Com. Alik), it indicates that he meant the possibility of complete victory by the words 'immense possibilities'. Or is it so that he drew attention to the aspect of the way the agreement was finalised in a hurry and in such a manner that the struggling unity which was developed amongst the villagers of Bhangor was broken? If he meant the latter, then we will see that there is much lacuna in his logic. The unity which developed for the purpose of the fight was bound to break after the agreement towards the settlement of the questions of power grid, compensation etc. was finalised. Besides, what is the benefit of the Communists in maintaining the old unity? What will the function of the 'Jami-Jibika' (Land-Livelihood) committee be even if it survives? What was really necessary was to develop a new unity rising above this motley kind of unity - the unity of agricultural labourers and poor peasants. However, there is no point in delving into the purport of what was meant by possibilities by Chintan. In the first place, we should understand revolutionary possibilities only whenever possibilities of a movement are talked about and to develop those possibilities would mean to develop the revolutionary elements objectively inherent (the degree may vary) in that movement. In other words, it would mean to raise the movement to a higher level from within the movement which would definitely depend to a large extent on the conscious efforts of the Communists. We have mentioned earlier that the revolutionary possibilities or the revolutionary elements of Bhangor movement were rooted mainly in the character of their principal demand. It is correct that the Communist Revolutionaries in the leadership of the Bhangor movement brought forth the above-mentioned elements amidst the participants of the movement with more clarity. It may also be assumed that they presented the fact how the crisis-stricken capitalists-imperialists are indiscriminately destroying the natural environment in their hankering for super-profit. But, if the centre of focus of this statement is on the point of why and how the power grid is devastating the people's life keeping in mind only the interest of the particular local movement of Bhangor, then it can be stated without doubt that the larger perspective of this statement is bound to be lost, especially in the consciousness of the backward people. This is actually what happened in Bhangor. In fact, what 'Chintan' said about the failure of the inherent 'possibilities' of Bhangor movement is here only in reality, nowhere else. The writer of Chintan did not grasp this or did not want to. It is difficult to say why. But it can be obviously said that if viewed from this angle, criticism for wasting the 'possibilities' should also be raised against the one or two Revolutionary organisations who were in leadership and not only against Com. Alik or Red Star; because none of them had raised any question or complaint regarding the first 19 months of the movement. Here a question can arise that what do we mean by development of those above-mentioned objective revolutionary possibilities? If the larger perspective means salvation of the environment from destruction and a countrywide united struggle of the mass of the people in the leadership of the working class against the rule of the big capitalists to achieve that goal, then we have mentioned earlier that such struggle is presently absent. We are well aware where the leading working class and the objective class struggle stand today. But we could have accomplished one thing at the least even being in the position of a group. We could have made the active section, especially the advanced section of the participants of the movement conscious to a certain degree at least by explaining the need for a bigger struggle and exposing the partial nature and the limitation of their struggle. Besides helping the tough struggle of advancing the fight in the face of severe adversities, the above-mentioned revolutionary campaign, especially explaining the need for a united struggle would have helped not only the future, but also the present. To state more lucidly, the participants of the movement could have come out of their rural backwardness to a certain extent and they themselves would have been able to think (especially from the experience of their movement spanning two years) whether it was possible to achieve complete victory under this situation by their lone fight i.e. to get the power grid entirely abolished. In that case, probably the impact of the failure to get the power grid entirely abolished would not have been so intense on the participants of the movement and Com. Alik would not have been compelled to rationalise anew to manage the strong dissension or to enforce his authority to get the agreement accepted. A few words in this context had been written in the preliminary comments in the last issue of For a Proletarian Party and its reiteration is unnecessary.
Easier said than done. It can be said without hesitation that Communist revolutionary activists, who have an experience of participating in or leading mass movements or factory-based union movements, would say the same. Undoubtedly it is correct. In the situation after the defeat of Communist movement, where the party is absent and class struggle is very weak, it is really very difficult to lead a mass movement, even a workers' movement in revolutionary direction standing firmly with revolutionary commitment. It is even truer in case of an assorted type of mass movement. We believe that they will theoretically agree with us that the task is difficult but it is feasible and this is what must be done; because we are more committed to the class struggle or the revolutionary struggle as Communist revolutionaries than to a particular movement. But the objective situation does not permit us to stay there and pushes us the other way. In reality, whether it is a general mass movement or a workers' movement, a formidably strong opponent, the combined aggressive campaign of the capitalists and the imperialists has to be confronted by the sole strength in an isolated condition. Then it becomes the chief task to keep alive the movement. After a certain time, it becomes the only task. It pushes from the position of a revolutionary organiser to merely the position of an organiser of the mass movement and compels to make various compromises with the reformist politics. It does not even strike into our consciousness all the times. In reality the interest of a particular movement, the interest of the leading revolutionary organisation, the revolutionary interest of the working class get all jumbled up. But the question is, will the path of the Communist revolutionaries be decided by the objective situation only? It should not ever happen that the proletarian politics will admit defeat under the sway of the objective situation. We have furthered our discussion keeping this in mind. So, however difficult it may be, we have to continue the hard task of this moment from our commitment to the class struggle.
Alliance With CPI (M) - Who Is The Gainer?
We have till now discussed the question of what should be the role of the Communist revolutionaries in the leadership of a mass movement. Now we will attend to a few other questions or subjects in continuation of this discussion. The first question is regarding going hand in hand with the CPM. We have seen that CPM was closely associated with the Bhangor movement. To participate in meetings with the 'Jami-Jibika' committee, to attend their annual conference, to take part in rallies jointly - we have seen all. It may be remembered by many that substantial protest was raised by a section of students and intellectuals against ceding a foothold in the movement to the CPM and going hand in hand with them. Their voice of protest was heard in the joint rallies even in front of the CPM leaders. They raised the slogan 'down with the mass murderers of Singur, Nandigram' and some similar ones. We had also opposed at that time. But the leadership of the Bhangor movement ignored all these objections and protests. The leadership means not only Com. Alik or Red Star, the standpoint of all others were the same. Contrarily, they presented many reasons in favour of allying with CPM. Chintan writer must have been aware of this. It is remarkable that a strong argument was put forth in favour of alliance with CPM in two successive articles in the national English periodical of Red Star organisation - one of which was written by their general secretary. The principal logic was that this alliance will help the movement and it is a question of tactics only, not of any policy or principle. But what happens if the tactics puts the policy or principle under question? If such a tactics is adopted that becomes a hindrance to reach the goal, then? In fact, there is no dearth of example of abandoning the principle in the name of tactics in the past history of the Communist movements. In our country, participation in bourgeois government was a tactics of CPM in the sixties of the last century. We have seen that history before our very eyes how the same tactics turned into a policy within a few years, how CPM turned into an election-oriented extremely reformist party. Actually, in proletarian politics, we cannot pass on any and every step or any line in the name of revolutionary tactics which is advantageous for a particular period.
It is not clearly known whether the line of alliance with CPM helped Bhangor movement in reality or boosted the morale of the participants of the movement at all. Bhangor is not outside West Bengal where the people have thrown the CPM out after being ruled by them for 34 years. Contrarily, their hold on this particular region was strong. Naturally these questions will arise that why the people of the same region gave an entry to CPM in their movement. Who were more eager to ally with CPM - the participants of the movement or the leadership? However, the real question at this moment is different. Even if it is assumed that the movement was benefited by the presence of CPM, then what had to be relinquished in exchange for that benefit - the question actually lies here. Undoubtedly this question is relevant because it is the Bhangor movement - not Singur or Nandigram. Here the leadership was in hands of the Communist revolutionaries for whom the present is not the ultimate, who fight for the future standing on the present. It is expected from the Communist leadership that they will not envisage the partial/local struggle of the people - including the economic struggle of the workers - detached from the bigger struggle (which has been discussed about earlier); rather on the contrary, they would perceive the objective struggles in relation with the countrywide class struggle of the future - the revolutionary struggle- and most importantly, they would guide the people, especially their advanced section in that direction and it goes without saying also that they would make them conscious standing on the objective experience of the struggle the degree of which will depend on the particularity and the extent of each struggle. Undoubtedly this task can be accomplished by the Communist Revolutionary groups who are leading the mass movements, or better to say, this task will be easier for them to accomplish if the struggling people can stand in an independent position by detaching themselves from all the old parties and opposing them. This situation was present in Bhangor. The villagers did not start their fight in alliance with Congress or CPM or depending on them. In that case they would not have placed Com. Alik in the leadership. In this situation if we, from the position of leadership, (especially when the participants of the movement put immense trust and reliance on Com. Alik) voluntarily cede a foothold to Congress or CPM in an independent mass movement with great possibilities like Bhangor then does it not make the expected revolutionary role of the leadership questionable? It must be remembered that CPM is not only the mass murderers of Singur, Nandigram, they are mainly identified as a bourgeois reformist party and they ruled in West Bengal for 34 long years from the position of a bourgeois constitutional government. It is to be remembered that in absence of the working class party and a strong current of class struggle generally the influence of reformism-opportunism on the mass including working class is very strong at this moment. Under this situation, the struggling people of Bhangor while battling out an extremely tough fight could have thought of accepting the help from Congress-CPM in the immediate interest of the movement, but wouldn't we convey a wrong lesson to the participants of the movement if we voluntarily cede a front position in the leadership to the CPM leaders? Everybody will admit that the demands of the Bhangor movement, its independent character and its extent contained possibilities, there was possibility of making the participants of the movement, especially their advanced section conscious and preparing them to an extent in relation to the bigger struggle. The alliance with CPM worked against this in reality. Tactics did not remain tactics any more. The loss became greater that the gain. This alliance also revealed that the leadership had put one-sided emphasis on the immediate interest of the movement, its success and achievement of victory of the movement.
Some More Points/Questions In Brief
We do not have much to say about the agreement. We mentioned earlier that it is not right to judge any movement by its victory or defeat, i.e. from what did we gain or lose. It must be remembered the limitations of a local-partial struggle cannot be overcome solely with the zeal of the participants of the movement and the expertise of the leadership; especially when the demand is intrinsically connected with the bourgeois system of exploitation and ruling. It may be easier to understand with an example of a workers' movement. Whatever might be the strength of a factory-based trade union movement, how far is it possible to achieve the demand of regularisation of all the contract workers, let alone the demand of complete abolition of contract system? In reality, in our opinion, it will not be the correct way of judging if anyone infers that the possibilities of the Bhangor movement had failed as because the power grid had stayed on in the end. They know very well that the demands were achieved entirely in Singur and Nandigram (though through the judicial course taken afterwards). There was much hype about Singur, Nandigram, especially amongst the petty-bourgeois. It is true that the demand was achieved entirely, but where do the struggling people of Singur-Nandigram stand today? They remained confined within the bourgeois limit. Although they achieved a victory (?), but the real victory was achieved by Trinamool and Mamata Banerjee, and ultimately it was a victory of electoral politics. But it is not at all correct to place Bhangor and Singur- Nandigram in the same series. In that case we would be focusing our eyes on merely the movement and nothing else. Then we won't be recognizing the fact that the Communists were at the leadership in Bhangor. So we find no need to scrutinize bit by bit the clauses of the Bhangor agreement. The real question is that where has the movement reached which lasted for two years and where will it lead towards in the future? The moot points are to what extent the level of consciousness of the struggling villagers could be elevated, how much could the base be prepared for building up the unity of the agricultural labourers and poor peasants in future etc. So far we have discussed considering this aspect. If we have to find 'victory' in historical movements, then it is here only that we have to search for- not in the achievement of the demands. Red Star may build their local group organisation in future with the semi-conscious individuals emerging from the movement in Bhangor and most probably they will do it, but it is not of much consideration. Moreover it does not prove anything, although there is not much scope to discuss what it actually proves in reality. Undoubtedly it is connected with group politics, which is there and will be there. Before concluding this subject, it may be clarified that we are not undermining the achievement of four lines instead of sixteen, compensation for land, particularly compensation for the people who suffered due to the movement, especially when the government was not willing to negotiate with the leadership for a long time. Undoubtedly the wholehearted struggle of the villagers of Bhangor compelled the government to yield. The participants of the movement will understand these themselves - it is they who will understand what have they gained or lost. But why did Com. Alik stress on 'what we gained' in his first interview and also on various later occasion, especially before the villagers? Maybe he did so to assuage the discontent arising amongst the participants of the movement during the agreement. But as a result he and his organisation not only appealed to the backwardness of the people but also amplified it. In reality, it helped to foster the backwardness instead of fighting against it. However, this may be accepted anyhow. But the way the proposal or the programme of government for rural development was counted under the list of 'what we gained' and brought to the forefront as a great victory of the movement that cannot be accepted. Did he not abet by such act the conspiracy of Trinamool government and Mamata Banerjee of winning over the minds of the villagers of Bhangor, who were assaulted and bruised in the struggle of two years? The most important question is that did he not encourage the reformist tendencies present within the people? In our opinion, a chief achievement of the formidably tough and difficult fight that continued for two years was that the people of Bhangor could resist the ruling party promoted goon Arabul's gang which is an example in this situation. It is a matter of apprehension whether they will be able to stand up to it now? Let us clarify at the end, these questions are being put forth for consideration and discussion and not to undermine or glorify anyone.
A Few Words Regarding The Criticism / Discontent Of The Chintan Writer
The first point to be noted that the Chintan writer did not raise any question regarding the way the movement had advanced, or to be precise, regarding the role of leadership during the first period of one year and nine months. His criticism is centred on the series of events of the last three months for which he held the chief leader or more clearly, the actions of Com. Alik and probably the Red Star organisation responsible. In his opinion, the undesirable rashness of the chief leadership in clinching the agreement, ignoring the opinions of the participants of the movement (which had already forcefully come to the forefront) and the proximity of the chief leader with police and administration damaged the movement considerably. Although it is not clear to us what the damage was. Is it that the Bhangor movement could not reach a successful culmination? Or was it the jolt incurred on the 'revolutionary emotion'? It is not clear about whose 'revolutionary emotion' was mentioned - the progressive democratic intellectuals or the working class, though the word 'emotion' is applicable to the first mentioned category only. However, he also said this, '.....we do not know the answer why he (the chief leader- present writer) had to take this damaging stand in the last phase even after playing an exemplary role representative of a revolutionary force throughout the entire period. But it is imperative to know this particular answer - if we want to take any general lesson from the experience of the Bhangor movement of course. The question remains that why the writer evaded this answer. However, we are of an opinion, after reading the whole article that the writer has an answer indeed and that is that the chief leader had deviated from the revolutionary principle and commitment to that principle. Otherwise he would have analysed the answer i.e. the origin of and the reason behind the sudden change of the chief leader - he would not have left this task to the uncertain future even five months after the culmination of the movement.
If we have to express our general opinion or stand regarding the direct or indirect criticism of the Chintan writer against the chief leader Com. Alik considering the series of events of the last three months, then we can say that we do not disagree with the criticism. The way dialogues were initiated with the government while being in police custody and secondly, the way Com. Alik imposed his authority to establish his opinion is not agreeable. But the question lies elsewhere. The first question is whether it is possible to judge/evaluate the role of leadership of any movement (workers' or peoples'- whichever it may be) in isolation from the disarrayed condition of the working class without a party after the defeat and a general phase of retreat of the workers' movement on the one hand, and the confinement of the Communists within their narrow group status for a long period of 45 years with the desire to expand their respective organisations etc. on the other hand. The second question is directed towards ourselves only. Even if we were at the chief leadership of the Bhangor movement and placed our group interest above everything else, would we have acted differently, especially if we were steered by the thought that the entire responsibility of the movement lies on us, not on the struggling people? To be precise, if we consider the actions of the chief leader as a deviation, then are we free of that deviation? The degree of deviation is debatable, but there is no need of that debate, because that will be an impediment to reach to the crux of the problem. It is also a fact that Communist revolutionaries, especially the non-worker intellectuals think and believe that workers (obviously general people also) cannot take their own movements forward and only the Communists have to take them forward by holding their hands. It has been noted that this imposed sense of responsibility acts within us in every field, not only in respect of the struggle for socialism, but also in respect of the trade union movement of the workers or a peoples' movement on any partial demand. Naturally we place ourselves above the movement in the position of a guardian, as if we only have to understand what is good or bad for the people and we only are capable to do that. The opponent, the employers, government and the bourgeois media put their efforts to show the leader as separated from the struggling people. On the other hand it is unfortunate but true that the workers also de facto place the educated leaders from outside in the position of guardians. If the workers had the self-confidence of their strength and power, they could have formed their opinions independently. But the old parties have smashed that self-confidence and consciousness of the workers. They have cultivated a habit of being blindly obedient to the leaders and it is a deep-seated habit for a long time. A hopeful fact is that the workers have started to come out of this habit though it is a beginning only. A great change cannot be expected until this beginning broadens up and spreads (the inevitable direction is towards that only). The present phase is such that the old is breaking or to be more specific, the process of breaking up has begun objectively but the new has not been built up - even the party of the working class has not been built up yet. We are in this situation and we are bound to move forward within this situation only. Under these circumstances, if there is weakness or deficiency in the conscious fight against the past deviations of the Communist movement in general and if there is negligence towards taking up a conscious role with the aim of encouraging the independent endeavour of the working class in general and also in this particular situation of the present topic and above all, if the present is emphasized losing the vision of the future - precisely speaking, if the question of success or the victory and the defeat becomes the principal consideration of the Communist leadership, then transformation of the leadership into guardianship and consequently the transformation of the guardianship into authority is inevitable. So, not only the criticism of Com. Alik as the chief leader of the Bhangor movement for the series of events of the last three months, but at the same time the deficiency of consciousness and weaknesses of the present-day Communists, their failure to hold fast to the proletarian politics in the fight against reformism-opportunism has to be criticised. The fight against ourselves should be launched with more vigour, a fight against unproletarian trends and deviations imposed from the past should be taken up - the Bhangor movement is bringing to the forefront this very lesson to us.
If any accusation arises that the threatening and terror from the side of police and administration had driven Com. Alik towards initiating a discussion with the government in individual capacity while being in police custody and ultimately clinching the agreement in a rash manner, we are not of the same opinion. Even if we accept that for the sake of debate, its responsibility lies not only on Com. Alik, but on the present condition of the Communist movement, on the narrow group politics and finally on the present condition of the class struggle.
We think that the way Com. Alik led the movement being rooted in Bhangor and participants of the movement placed unconditional faith and trust on him, it made him take upon himself the onus of the success and failure, the good and bad of the movement from the above-mentioned feeling of guardianship. Probably for this reason, when he felt that the proposal of the government for settlement is acceptable and the struggle should be ended on the basis of that, he continued dialogues with the government in individual capacity as a custodian of the movement in the interest of the movement only and he did not feel the need to know the opinion of the committee. Perhaps he had assumed that those very people have conferred him the right to continue the dialogue that had placed him in the seat of authority from their faith and trust. What other reason there can be for continuing the dialogue even while being in police custody? In effect he had assumed that whatever he was doing, it was for betterment and the participants of the movement will definitely accept that. The question arises here only that even it is accepted for the sake of debate that the participants of the movement had placed the onus of success and failure of the movement in the hands of the leader, why did the leader consented to that, being a Communist? It is not unknown to the Communists that the leader does not build up a movement , it is built up by the people, and the success and failure of the movement does not depend on the expertise or the charisma of the leader, basically it depends on the fighting consciousness of the participants of the movement. The leader can even discern what will be the correct step at a certain moment, but where will it be verified that it is not a subjective idea of the leader? It goes without saying that it should be amongst the participants of the movement. In short, those who are fighting will decide which step is correct and which is wrong. The leader can make the followers think and he should do so. But the people within the struggle should judge whether the thoughts of the leader are correct or not. The leader can try to bring them to a consensus in opinion. But on the contrary, we cannot impose 'our' ideas with authoritative power placing ourselves as guardians in the name of backwardness of the people. The experience of the process of agreement of the Bhangor movement and the strong opposition of the participants of the movement to the conditions of the agreement brought the above-mentioned truth forcefully before us.
The Chintan writer raised a few questions related to the joint movement in the concluding part of his article. He wrote, "those who are resolute to fight relentlessly against the police system....how would they hold the spirit of the joint movement (was it there at all??present author) and elevate it to a higher level has become a question of great importance". If the writer had made a 'deep search' and 'self-realisation' comparing with the joint movements of the past i.e. the joint programmes of the communist revolutionaries, then he himself would have understood that there is no answer or solution to his questions in the present objective reality. The reason of this absence is embedded in the word 'group'. In the first place, the above-mentioned joint movement can be divided in two categories. First: the joint or united movement of two or more different and separate movements of the people, and second: the joint participation of the leaders of a number of groups in the same movement, as was the case in Bhangor movement - although the latter should be called joint programme instead of joint movement. In the first instance, the objective necessity and the urge for united struggle of the rank and file would hold the different leaderships in cohesion. Someone may betray during the struggle, but he would have to do it at the risk of being isolated from the struggling people. It goes without saying that in the second case, continuance of the joint programme will depend on the subjective standpoints of the concerned groups - bluntly speaking, on their respective necessities and narrow group interests. When Com. Alik and his organisation Red Star, being in the position of leadership in the Bhangor movement, felt the need to end the movement, how easily they ignored their partners in the 'joint movement' to proceed towards the agreement while showing mere courtesy by throwing up some shallow words like 'misunderstandings'! This is very natural in group position and it will continue to happen till the group existence persists. In effect, the party's interest became greater than the class interest; in other words, how the commitment to the class was degraded to the level of commitment to the party and ultimately the party became isolated from the class - we cannot forget that unfortunate history or example of the world socialist movement. Now there is no party at all and the Communists are divided into a number of groups. The tendency to give more importance to the group interest than to the party interest is bound to be stronger under the present circumstances. In reality, if the groups view their development, or to be more precise, their growth i.e. the expansion of their organisation as a condition of development of class struggle, then this will recur inevitably. The competition of increasing their respective influence i.e. of expanding their organisations will continue, be it through the movements of the people on partial demands or through present trade union movements of the workers. The experience of 'joint movements' like Bhangor will recur. So, the answer or the solution to the question which was raised by the Chintan writer is not present in the deep search, self-realisation, sincere and principled practice. There is only one answer and that is the dissolution of group existence. There is no scope of such dissolution through building of the party on the basis of unity of the groups - the experience of last 40 years is sufficient proof of that. Hence, every Communist has to view their 'group interest' as included within the interest of the development of the objective possibility emerging within the independent organisation and struggle of the newly awakened workers - this is the demand of the present post-defeat situation. n
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